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Lessons From the Pupil: A Canadian 
Solution to the American Exclusionary Rule 
Debate 
James Stribopoulos* 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern constitutional documents frequently incorporate specific 
restraints on police investigatory powers. These provisions typically 
supplement guarantees aimed at ensuring fair standards in the crimi-
nal process, for those detained or charged with a crime.! Most of these 
documents echo themes first articulated in the United States' Bill of 
Rights2 and reiterated centuries later in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.3 
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of Laws (LL.M.) at Columbia University School of Law, in the City of New York. I would like to 
thank Professor Debra Livingston (Columbia University), Professor Louis Henkin (Columbia 
University), Gary Svirsky (Columbia LL.M. 1997), Peter Danchin (Columbia University, LL.M., 
1997), Martijn VanMaanen (Columbia, LL.M., 1997), and Karen Brimberg UohnJay College of 
Criminal Justice), all of whom read earlier drafts of this paper. A special debt of gratitude is owed 
to Professor Gerard Lynch (Columbia University) who provided immeasurable assistance through 
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I See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), 
§§ 7-14 [hereinafter "the Canadian Chartei' or "the Charte7"]; IR. CONST. art. 40, para. 5; New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act, No. 109 (1990), §§ 9, 21-27; REp. OF SOUTH AFRICA CONST. (Act 200 
of 1993), as amended, (South Mrican Bill of Rights), §§ 13, 25. 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures); amend. V 
(right not to stand trial for infamous crimes unless a grand jury returns an indictment, prohibi-
tion against double jeopardy, prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination, due process 
guarantee); amend. VI (right to speedy and public trial, right to impartial jury trial, right to 
confront witnesses, right to compulsory process to obtain presence of witnesses at trial, right to 
assistance of counsel); amend. XIV (application of due process guarantee to States). 
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/81O, art. 3 (right to life, 
liberty & security of the person); art. 5 (prohibition against torture or other forms of cruel and 
unusual punishment); art. 9 (prohibition against arbitrary arrest or exile); art. 11 (guarantee that 
those charged with offenses will be presumed innocent, receive fair public trials and not be 
subjected to retroactive laws); art. 12 (safeguards related to the individual's privacy interests). 
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These recent global developments are not surprising. The potential 
for tyranny is constant, even in modern societies. Those drafting con-
temporary constitutional documents need only recall the very recent 
experience in South Mrica to be reminded of the dangers that flow 
from unchecked police powers. Throughout history, oppressive re-
gimes have used their unlimited police powers to search the homes of 
political opponents, to detain dissidents without trial, to conduct "show 
trials" for political purposes, or to subject opponents to torture or 
other extreme forms of punishment. Limitless police powers take the 
greatest toll on a society's most vulnerable members: the young, the 
homeless, the poor, racial or ethnic minorities, and political dissidents. 
It must be recognized, however, that in modern society, crime is one 
of the greatest threats to individual safety. If a society is so crime ridden 
that its members live in a perpetual state of fear, the niceties of consti-
tutionalliberty may seem unimportant to the populace. Fear of crime 
and criminals provokes a demand for government action. In such 
anxious moments, individual liberty faces its greatest challenge. Justice 
Brandeis' warning, eloquently expressed almost seventy years ago, still 
rings true today: 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to pro-
tect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. 
Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of 
their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to 
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding.4 
Perhaps no single issue brings these two competing concerns into 
greater contrast than the dilemma created when police excesses yield 
inculpatory evidence against a criminal accused. When evidence has 
been obtained in contravention of the Constitution, two opposing 
concerns meet: society's interest in seeing that persons guilty of crime 
are detected, prosecuted, convicted and punished, and a concurrent 
societal interest in safeguarding individual liberties against unlawful or 
unconstitutional police conduct.5 
4 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis,]., dissenting). 
5 See].B. Dawson, The Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence: A Comparative Study, 31INT'L 
& COMPo L.Q. 513, 513 (1982); C.L. Peiris, The Admissibility of Evidence Obtained IllegaUy: A 
Comparative Analysis, 13 OTTAWA L. REv. 309, 309 (1981); Meng H. Yeo, The Discretion to Exclude 
illegally and Improperly Obtained Evidence: A Choice of Approaches, 13 MELB. U. L. REv. 31, 36 
(1981); Sharon Williams, Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence: A Comparison of English and 
American Law, 57 UMKC L. REv. 315, 316 (1989). 
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In the United States, these differing principles are presently resolved 
in favor of individual liberty, through the use of the exclusionary rule. 6 
But the status of the American exclusionary rule is anything but "re-
solved." Since its creation, the rule has led to extensive litigation and 
a never-ending flow of academic commentary. The debate surrounding 
the issue has continued unabated in the United States for almost 
one hundred years. Generally, two opposing viewpoints have emerged, 
those who want to abolish the exclusionary rule and those who wish 
to retain it. I will first briefly summarize their respective positions and 
later analyze each more extensively within this paper. 
Opponents of the exclusionary rule argue that this extreme remedy 
is not required by the Constitution. They claim the rule is merely 
judicially created, fashioned to protect constitutional rights by deter-
ring future police illegality. Critics complain that the exclusionary rule 
is not an effective deterrent and exacts a huge toll in lost convictions. 
According to critics, the rule's costs outweigh its negligible benefits. 
6 There are a number of distinct exclusionary rules that have been developed under the Fourth, 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI. Although each rule is somewhat 
controversial, it is the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule which has been subjected to unceas-
ing criticism. For this reason, the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment will be the 
focus of this paper. 
With respect to the Fifth Amendment, the "exclusionary rule" is built into the constitutional 
guarantee; a person may not "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 
See id. amend. V. Any compelled statements are automatically rendered inadmissible. The Su-
preme Court supplemented the Fifth Amendment with a number of warnings that must be given 
prior to custodial interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). These warnings 
were intended as prophylactic measures, thought necessary to dispel the inherently coercive 
atmosphere of such encounters. If authorities fail to administer these warnings prior to custodial 
interrogation or if a suspect is interrogated without waiving the rights conferred by these warnings 
or after asserting any of these prophylactic rights, any statement obtained is excluded. See id.; see, 
e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Edwards 
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U.S. 433 (1974). But statements obtained in violation of Miranda, that are not involuntary, will 
be admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching a defendant's credibility on cross-examina-
tion. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1979). In addition, under both the due process prong 
of the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, a residual discre-
tion exists to exclude evidence that has been obtained by methods that offend "a sense of justice " 
through conduct that "shocks the conscience." See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
Under the Sixth Amendment, the right to the assistance of counsel is only operative after 
formal adversarial proceedings are commenced. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). As a 
result, a post-indictment identification following a line-up will be inadmissible if counsel was not 
present, unless the defendant intelligently waived this right. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218 (1967). Similarly, a statement obtained following post-indictment interrogation without 
counsel will be excluded, unless a valid waiver is demonstrated. See Massiah v. United States, 377 
U.S. 201 (1964); see also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 
387 (1977). 
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Therefore, it is invariably argued, the exclusionary rule should be 
replaced with some more effective and less costly alternative remedy. 
In stark contrast, proponents of the exclusionary rule insist that it is 
mandated by the Constitution and serves as an effective deterrent. 
They argue that those who criticize its deterrent value fail to recognize 
that the rule is necessary to preserve judicial integrity and compensate 
individual victims of police illegality. Proponents complain that the 
rule's detractors mask a dissatisfaction with substantive constitutional 
guarantees, under an attack on the exclusionary remedy. If law en-
forcement obeys the constitutional rules, as they should, then there 
would be no illegally obtained evidence to be excluded. According to 
proponents, this remedy is matchless. No other device is equally capa-
ble of safeguarding the Constitution's guarantees in a criminal context. 
This debate concerning the exclusionary rule has consumed aca-
demic literature for the last eighty years. As Justice Cardozo (then 
Judge) remarked in 1926, "[t]o what [has been] written [about the 
exclusionary rule], little of value can be added."7 Throughout the last 
thirty-five years, the debate has been defined by the Supreme Court's 
decision in Mapp v. Ohio,8 which first applied the exclusionary rule to 
the States. But Mapp has had the unfortunate effect of making the 
ensuing debate largely theoretical and speculative. "Now that the ex-
clusionary rule is a constitutional doctrine uniformly applicable 
throughout the United States there can be no experimenting below 
this mandated level of due process."9 
As a result, the contemporary debate has generally focused on 
whether the automatic exclusionary rule should be retained or abol-
ished and whether some other remedy might be just as effective. The 
entire debate has been riddled with endless conjecture. Since "Mapp 
was decided, it has not been possible to gather data on the relative 
effectiveness of alternative methods of deterring [constitutional] vio-
lations."lo It is for this reason that commentators and courts in the 
7 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). Ironically, it was in this very opinion that Judge 
Cardozo phrased the most often cited criticism of the rule, • [tl he criminal is to go free because 
the constable has blundered." 
8367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
9 Lewis R. Katz, &flectWns on Search and Seizure and Illegally Seized Evidence in Canada and the 
United States, 3 CAN-U.S. LJ. lO3, lO7 (1980); see afJo William R. Baldiga, Excluding Evidence to 
Protect Rights: Principles Underlying the Exclusionary Rule in England and the United States, 6 B.C. 
INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 133, 134 (1983). 
\0 Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future 
o/the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1398 (1983). 
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United States should remain cognizant of what has been occurring in 
other countries, which may provide guidance on the approach that 
should be taken in the futureY 
Part of the difficulty with the American approach is that foreign legal 
systems are examined infrequently. If such inquiry occurs, it is typically 
undertaken by critics of the exclusionary rule. These critics are keen 
to point out that many highly regarded legal systems in other free and 
democratic countries do not use exclusion,I2 or use it so rarely that its 
impact on the administration of justice is minimal. I!! In their zeal to 
make this "compelling" point against the exclusionary rule, some com-
mentators have even misstated the law in other jurisdictions. 14 
Comparing the American experience to that of other democratic 
nations can prove extremely useful. Comparison with Commonwealth 
nations is intuitively appealing, given that these countries trace their 
legal traditions to the Englishjustice system, as does the United States. 
It must be recalled, however, that each nation has a distinct history, 
culture, and legal tradition which undoubtedly shapes their approach 
to improperly or illegally obtained evidence. I5 With the exception of 
Canada, none of these other nations has imposed constitutional re-
straints on police powers. Instead, these nations depend upon statutes 
and the common law to define the scope of police authority. 
For comparative purposes, Canada is unlike any other Common-
wealth nation. Canada and the United States share close geographic 
proximity, similar cultures, and a common language. Both nations have 
ethnically diverse populations forged from immigrant citizens who 
predominately reside in concentrated urban areas. Both nations have 
II See Baldiga, supra note 9, at 134. 
12 SeeBivensv. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); 
Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exdusiunary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 
701"'{)6 (1970). 
U Barry F. Shanks, Comment, Comparative Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 
57 ThL. L. REv. 648, 680 (1983). 
14 See Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusiunary Rule: Heeding Justice 
Blackmun's Cau to Examine the Rule in Light Of ChangingJudicial Understanding About Its Effects 
Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 45, 60-62 (1994). The authors correctly point out that 
evidentiary exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in Canada is governed by section 
24(2) of the Canadian Oiarter, but proceed to assert that the governing case is R. v. Wray, 11 
D.L.R. (3d) 673 (S.C.C. 1970). This decision predated the Oiarterby some eleven years and the 
position it sets out was expressly abandoned by the Supreme Court of Canada in Collins v. The 
Queen [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265. Curiously, in the footnote for the Wray decision the authors omit the 
year of the decision. See id. 
15 See Katz, supra note 9, at 108. 
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prospered throughout the post-war era and share similar levels of 
economic development. Although differences definitely exist, it is ar-
guable that no two nations share so many similarities. I6 It is for these 
reasons that one commentator noted: 
The Canadian experience on the subject . . . may very well 
be the best place for United States lawyers to look for an 
alternative to the exclusionary rule. Justice Felix Frankfurter 
used to look upon the states as (then) forty-eight laboratories 
developing their own approaches to criminal justice and the 
protection of fundamental individual rights .... Absent our 
own ability to practice alternatives to the exclusionary rule, 
we might logically look to Canada to examine that country's 
experience in protecting the right of privacy and dealing with 
unreasonable government intrusions. I7 
These comments are even more compelling in the period since 1982 
when Canada, like the United States, elevated constraints on police 
powers into a constitutional requirement. The Canadian Charter in-
cludes numerous provisions that draw heavily upon the American Bill 
of Rights and frequently mirrors rights which American courts have 
incorporated into the Constitution. IS 
16The differences that may be noted include: i) the United States cut its ties to Great Britain 
through revolutionary struggle, while Canada chose a gradual process which was only truly 
completed in 1982 when the Canadian Constitution was patriated; ii) the American Constitution 
was drafted in the eighteenth century, while the Canadian Charter is a relatively modern consti-
tutional instrument; iii) Canada's population is about one-tenth the size of that of the United 
States; iv) slavery was never permitted in Canada and, accordingly, the racial tensions that scar 
American history are not as prevalent in Canada; v) on a per capita basis, Canada has a far lower 
crime rate than the United States, which may be attributable to more stringent firearms controls 
and a more expansive social safety net. See AJ. Perry, American Constitutional Jurisprudence as an 
Interpretive Source fur the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 3 CROWN C. REv. 4, 4 (1983); Brian 
Dickson, Has the Charter ''Americanized" Canada'sJudiciary7 A Summary and Analysis, 26 U.B.C. 
L. REv. 195, 200-02 (1992). 
17Katz, supra note 9, at 107. 
18 See Canadian Charter, supra note I, § 7 ("right to life, liberty and security of the person and 
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice," similar to the due process guarantee in the U.S. Constitution and art. 3 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights); § 8 ("right to be secure against unreasonable searches or seizures," 
practically identical to the Fourth Amendment); § 9 ("right not to be arbitrarily detained or 
imprisoned," similar to art. 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); § 10 (right upon 
arrest and detention to be promptly informed of the reason, to retain counsel and be informed 
of that right, similar to Miranda warnings and right to counsel conferred by the Sixth Amend-
ment); § 11 (right to speedy trial, right not to be compelled as witness against oneself, right to 
be presumed innocent, right to reasonable bail, right to public trial by impartial tribunal, right 
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More specifically, the Canadian Charter contains an explicit provision 
addressing how to deal with unconstitutionally obtained evidence.19 No 
such provision appears in the U.S. Bill of Rights. The exclusionary rule 
in Canada, unlike that of the United States, does not automatically 
result in exclusion once a constitutional violation is established. In-
stead, if evidence has been obtained in an unconstitutional manner, a 
discretionary analysis is triggered to determine its admissibility. 
Close analysis of Canadian Charter developmen t reveals a fundamen-
tal flaw in the traditional exclusionary rule debate in the United States. 
Early on in the debate's evolution, Justice Holmes observed that the 
court was faced with two options: 
Therefore we must consider the two objects of desire, both 
of which we cannot have, and make up our minds which to 
choose. It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and 
to that end that all available evidence should be used. It is 
also desirable that the Government should not itself foster 
and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which 
the evidence is to be obtained.20 
But the Canadian experience reveals that there is a third choice that 
sits between automatic exclusion and admissibility.21 Employing a dis-
cretionary approach may provoke proponents and opponents of the 
American exclusionary rule to scoff. Opponents will likely advance the 
to jury trial where potential punishment exceeds five years, right not to be subjected to retroactive 
criminal laws, and double jeopardy rights-all of which draw heavily on the Fifth, Sixth and 
Eighth Amendments, as well as arts. 10 & 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); § 12 
("right not to be subject to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment," drawing on the Eighth 
Amendment and art. 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
19 See id. at § 24(2). 
20 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928). 
21 In fairness, some American commentators have advocated a discretionary approach to the 
exclusion of evidence, but proponents of this position have not made reference to the Canadian 
experience since the Charter was enacted. See H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE 
FLAWED PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN AMERICA 70 (1996); Wayne J. Westling, The Anglo-Australian 
Rule of Discretionary Exclusion: An Alternative for the United States?, 31 INT'L. J. OFF. THER. & 
COMPo CRIMINOLOGY 203 (1987). Only a few American commentators have taken note of Cana-
dian developments after the introduction of the Charter. See Jerome Atrens, A Comparison of 
Canadian and American Constitutional Law Relating to Search and Seizure, 1 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 
29, 4~7 (1994); Robert A. Harvie, The Exclusionary Rule and the Good Faith Doctrine in the 
United States and Canada: A Comparison, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo LJ. 779, 795-98 (1992); 
CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 113 (1993); Donald 
L. MacDougall, The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives-Remedies for Constitutional Violations 
in Canada and the United States, 76J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 608 (1985). 
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same arguments against a discretionary approach that are put forward 
against an automatic rule. But the Canadian experience prior to the 
Charter reveals that the alternative remedies that critics advocate are 
ineffective. This is the principal reason that Canada embraced an 
exclusionary rule in the Charter. In contrast, proponents of the auto-
matic exclusionary rule will likely complain that a discretionary rem-
edy would be ineffective in safeguarding constitutional rights. But close 
analysis of the Canadian experience reveals that a discretionary rule 
produces numerous benefits over an automatic rule. 
There are four main benefits to Canada's discretionary approach to 
the exclusion of evidence under the Charter. First, the rule avoids 
the unfairness that has spawned much criticism in the United States 
against the American exclusionary rule. Second, such a rule does not 
suffer from progressive narrowing of application, a problem which has 
occurred in the United States, as the deterrent benefits of the rule are 
determined to be inapplicable in certain situations. Third, the discre-
tionary approach does not foster a judicial reluctance to recognize 
constitutional violations where they have occurred due to fear that 
exclusion will automatically follow. Finally, and most importantly, a 
discretionary rule leads to a more expansive and honest definition 
of constitutional rights. Courts are not continually preoccupied with 
the consequences that flow from their interpretation of constitutional 
guarantees. The interpretation of constitutional rights in Canada is not 
tainted by an effort to achieve desired results in individual cases. 
This article will first consider the approach to illegally obtained 
evidence employed by England, Scotland, and Australia, in an effort 
to demonstrate that evidentiary exclusion is necessary for reasons 
beyond deterring unlawful police behavior, even in nations that do not 
have entrenched constitutional guarantees. It will then focus on the 
origins of the exclusionary rule in the United States, including its 
evolution since the beginning of the twentieth century. The varying 
rationales underlying the American exclusionary rule will also be ex-
amined, as will the ongoing debate that continues to rage in the 
literature. Finally, the birth of a discretionary exclusionary rule in 
Canada will be considered, with emphasis placed on the benefits of 
such an approach. 
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I. EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN OTHER jURSIDICTIONS 
A. England 
Early English cases reveal dissatisfaction with illegal activities under-
taken by law enforcement officials to secure evidence of crime. But 
despite this discontent, English courts were initially loath to exclude 
illegally obtained evidence. Instead, English judges, while criticizing 
improper behavior on the part of the police, would invariably admit 
evidence relevant to an accused's guilt, no matter how it was obtained.22 
The English position on the effect of police illegality, up until the 
mid-twentieth century, is appropriately summarized by the following 
statement contained in an 1861 decision: "It matters not how you get 
it; if you steal it even, it would be admissible in evidence. "23 
Throughout "the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, English 
courts regarded the method of obtaining evidence to be irrelevant to 
its admissibility."24 But during the early part of the twentieth century, 
English courts began developing evidentiary rules that excluded un-
duly prejudicial evidence. These developments were premised on the 
need for basic fairness in criminal proceedings. On this basis, rules 
were crafted to exclude bad character evidence, involuntary admis-
sions, and similar act evidence.25 It was not until 1955 that the Privy 
Council employed similar reasoning to unlawfully obtained evidence, 
holding that such evidence should on occasion be excluded. 
In Kuruma v. R,26 the Privy Council indicated that "[nJo doubt in a 
criminal case the judge always has a discretion to disallow evidence if 
the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against an ac-
cused ... [iJf, for instance, some admission of a piece of evidence ... 
had been obtained from a defendant by a trick."27 In subsequent 
decisions, the court's discretion to exclude evidence was expanded. 
Not only would police trickery or misrepresentations to an accused 
trigger the discretion, but bribery, threats, or other oppressive behavior 
would have a similar effect. 28 
22 See Audrey S. Brent, Illegally Obtained Evidence: An Historical and Comparative Analysis, 48 
SASK. REv. 1,2-3 (1983), and cases cited therein. 
23R. v. Leatham, 8 Cox C.C. 498, 501 (Q.B. 1861). 
24 Baldiga, supra note 9, at 135. 
25 See id. at 136. 
26 1955 App. Cas. 197. 
27Id. at 204. 
28 See Callis v. Gunn, 1 Q.B. 495, 501 (1964); R. v. Payne, 1 W.L.R. 637, 638 (1963); Jeffrey v. 
Black, 1 All E.R. 555, 563 (1978). 
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Although a number of decisions re-affirmed the discretion recog-
nized in Kuruma, the pronouncements were typically more theoretical 
than practical. During the twenty-five year period following Kuruma, 
there are only two reported cases in which English courts chose to 
exercise their discretion to exclude evidence.29 In fact, the House of 
Lords cautioned that although the discretion existed, it was only to be 
used in rare and exceptional cases.30 The conflict between principle 
and practice fueled an adherence to the conventional rule. Evidence 
still remained admissible in practice no matter how it was obtained.31 
In the ensuing years, practice had become so divorced from theory 
that the House of Lords decided to correct this discrepancy. In R v. 
Sang,32 the court indicated: 
(1) A trial judge in a criminal trial has always a discretion 
to refuse to admit evidence if in his opinion its prejudicial 
effect outweighs its probative value. 
(2) Save with regard to admission and confessions and 
generally with regard to evidence obtained from the accused 
after commission of the offence, he has no discretion to 
refuse to admit relevant admissible evidence on the ground 
that it was obtained by improper or unfair means.33 
Sang returned English law to the conventional common law position: 
evidence would not be excluded because of police illegality or impro-
priety. The decision effectively brought an end to the questions that 
had lingered following Kuruma.34 Yet, the House of Lords had not 
spoken unanimously; not all of the Lords were content with the ma-
jority's approach.35 
This dissatisfaction was not restricted to members of the judiciary. 
In 1981, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure released a 
report calling for sweeping reforms within the English criminal justice 
system.36 The Commission recommended substantial revisions to the 
l!9 See R. v. Court, 1962 CRIM. L. REv. 697 (1962); Payne, 1 W.L.R 637. 
!Ill See jeffrey, 1 All E.R at 559. 
!l See Yeo, su.pra note 5, at 33. 
!23 W.L.R 263 (1979). 
33Id. at 272. 
M The Sang holding was re-affirmed in R. v. Adams, 3 W.L.R 275, 283 (CA. 1980) and in Morris 
v. Beardmore, 3 W.L.R 283, 287 (H.L. 1980). 
!5 Three members of the House of Lords were prepared to recognize a broader discretion to 
refuse the admission of illegally obtained evidence. 
36 See Baldiga, supra note 9, at 147-60. The author details the findings and recommendations 
contained in the Commission's Report. See id. 
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scope of the "exclusionary rule" and noted the importance of society's 
interest in having all evidence admitted that might assist in securing a 
conviction. Against this pressing concern the Commission identified 
two competing principles that weighed in favor of exclusion. First, the 
Commission recognized that exclusion is necessary to prevent the 
government from securing an improper advantage over the accused. 
Second, the Commission noted that exclusion is necessary where ille-
gally obtained evidence, such as a coerced confession, is of question-
able reliability and where the defendant's admission compromises the 
fairness of the triaP7 
In striking a balance between these competing considerations, the 
Commission advocated that exclusion occur whenever the government 
has violated a right traditionally and emphatically protected by English 
law. In circumstances where the illegality involves a procedural defect 
of a technical nature, the Commission suggested that the evidence 
obtained should be admitted.38 The Commission's recommendations 
formed the basis for a complete legislative overhaul of the English 
system of criminal procedure, including the exclusionary rule. In 1984, 
in the wake of the Commission's Report, Parliament introduced The 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE).39 The Act includes a provi-
sion dealing explicitly with evidentiary exclusion. Section 78 states that 
evidence may be excluded "if it appears to the court that, having regard 
to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the 
evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such 
an adverse effect on the fairness of the trial that the court ought not 
to admit it." 
The recognition of an exclusionary rule by Parliament served as a 
long-awaited catalyst, prompting English courts to employ evidentiary 
exclusion in circumstances where police violated fundamental provi-
sions of PACE. Since the Act was introduced, English courts have 
regularly excluded statements and physical evidence where the re-
quirements of the Act have been ignored by the police.40 In explaining 
the transformation of the English judiciary since PACE, an English 
commentator indicated that it "seems to reflect a growing disillusion-
ment with police pretensions to professionalism and self-regulatory 
capacity ... a renewed judicial commitment to rule of law principles 
57 [d. at 149-50. 
58 [d. at 152-53. 
!l9Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1985 (Eng.) [hereinafter PACE]. 
40 See BRADLEY, supra note 21, at 106-08 and the numerous cases cited therein. 
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and the ideal of legal accountability for the exercise of police powers, 
and the failure of other forms of legal control over the police. "41 
Three points about the English experience are important to bear in 
mind. First, deterrence of future illegality by the police is not the 
principal motivation underlying these developments. Instead, the im-
petus for the exclusionary rule would appear to be dissatisfaction with 
allowing the government to secure an advantage from its own illegality, 
concern with respect to the effect of unreliable evidence on the fair-
ness of an accused's trial, and dissatisfaction with alternative methods 
for disciplining the police.42 Undoubtedly, deterrence of future impro-
priety is a hoped for by-product of exclusion, but it is not the driving 
force. 
Secondly, English courts exclude evidence if it was obtained in vio-
lation of a statute. PACE, like all other Acts of Parliament, does not 
have constitutional status in England. The statute is not England's 
"supreme law," but nonetheless, exclusion has been utilized to enforce 
its edicts. 
Finally, and most importantly, England has specifically rejected an 
automatic exclusionary rule in favor of a discretionary approach. In 
embracing this middle ground, England cited the injustice that would 
result if the inadvertent violation of technical procedural rules auto-
matically led to exclusion. In such circumstances, the British have 
chosen to emphasize societal interests over those of the individual 
accused.43 
B. Scotland 
Scottish courts have long recognized the need for an exclusionary 
rule. In the leading case on evidentiary exclusion, Lawrie v. Muir,44 the 
41 Id. at 105, where the author quotes David Feldman, Regulating Treatment of Suspect in Police 
Stations: Judicial Interpretation of Detention Provision in the Police and Criminal Act 1984, 1990 
CRIM. L. REv. 452 (1990). 
42 It is important to note that since 1976, the English have had an external police disciplinary 
procedure in place. See Dawson, supra note 5, at 544-46; Williams, supra note 5, at 327-29 (for 
explanations of the police complaint procedures in the United Kingdom and the extensive 
problems inherent in this approach). All complaints against the police are channeled through 
the Police Complaints Board. See Dawson, supra note 5, at 544-46; Williams, supra note 5, at 
327-29. The Board, which consists of nine members, none of whom has previously served with 
the police, has the power to convene hearings and discipline officers. See Dawson, supra note 5, 
at 544-46; Williams, supra note 5, at 327-29. In addition, where the Board feels that criminal 
charges might be warranted, complaints may be forwarded to the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
See Dawson, supra note 5, at 544-46; Williams, supra note 5, at 327-29. 
4! See Baldiga, supra note 9, at 153. 
44 Lawrie v. Muir, 1950 S.L.T. 37, 39-40 (H.CJ.). 
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Scottish High Court acknowledged that the law must attempt to rec-
oncile two competing considerations: the public interest in the admis-
sibility of all evidence bearing on an accused's guilt and the competing 
interest of the citizen to be protected from illegal or irregular invasions 
of his liberties by the authorities. The Court recognized that neither 
interest should dominate the other.45 Illegally or irregularly obtained 
evidence, however, is generally inadmissible unless the illegality or 
irregularity associated with its procurement can be excused by the 
court.46 
The Court in Lawrie provided limited guidance on what factors 
should lead courts to excuse illegality or irregularity. The Court indi-
cated: 
[T]he question [is] one of circumstances .... It would greatly 
facilitate the task of judges were it possible to imprison the 
principle within the framework of a simple and unqualified 
maxim, but I do not think that it is feasible to do so. . . . 
Irregularities require to be excused, and infringements of the 
formalities of the law in relation to these matters are not 
lightly to be condoned. Whether any given irregularity ought 
to be excused depends upon the nature of the irregularity 
and the circumstances under which it was committed.47 
The court concluded that the evidence obtained through an unlawful 
search of the accused's business had to be excluded and rejected the 
officers' claim that they had acted in good faith. 
A number of subsequent Scottish decisions have refined the discre-
tion to exclude evidence, delineating the types of circumstances that 
may excuse official illegality. The intention of the authorities has 
played a major role in this determination. If the officials deliberately 
deprive an individual of his rights, it is unlikely that the court will 
excuse the illegality.48 The reason for taking such a strict approach to 
deliberate lawlessness is twofold. First, to do otherwise would nullity 
the liberties of the individual citizen and cause the authorities to 
45 See iii. at 39. 
46 SHERIFF MACPHAIL, LAw OF EVIDENCE IN SCOTLAND, para. 21.01 (1979). 
47 Lawrie, 1950 S.L.T. at 39-40. 
4B See M'Govern v. H.M. Advocate, 1950 S.L.T. 133, 135 (H.C].) (results from fingernail scrap-
ings taken from accused were excluded, there was no lawful basis to take the scrapings and the 
intentional conduct of the police constituted an assault); H.M. Advocate v. Turnbull, 1951 S.L.T. 
409 (H.CJ.) (files held inadmissible because court found officers deliberately seized files in 
addition to those authorized in the warrant). 
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employ unlawful investigative techniques. Second, admitting evidence 
deliberately obtained through unlawful means threatens the fairness 
of an accused's trial by permitting the state to obtain a tactical advan-
tage on the back of the accused's civilliberties.49 
In contrast, if the illegality was inadvertent, Scottish courts normally 
admit the evidence obtained.50 Similarly, illegality has been excused 
when the authorities have acted in exigent circumstances where strict 
compliance with the law gives rise to a reasonable fear that the evi-
dence may be destroyed or moved.51 Like the English experience, there 
are a number of important lessons to be derived from the Scottish 
approach to illegally obtained evidence. 
First, although deterrence is a major factor, it is not the sole rationale 
for the Scottish exclusionary rule. Instead, Scottish courts choose to 
emphasize fairness to the aggrieved party. If the authorities are permit-
ted to use illegally obtained evidence at trial, and thereby obtain an 
advantage over the accused by violating his legal rights, the fairness of 
the accused's trial is markedly diminished. 
Second, Scottish courts, like their English counterparts, have deter-
mined that the power to exclude evidence is necessary when authori-
ties violate regular laws. Exclusion is not employed in response to 
constitutional violations, as there are no entrenched individual consti-
tutional rights in Scotland. Violations of regular laws are sufficient to 
warrant exclusion of evidence. 
Third, the Scottish have rejected the automatic exclusionary rule as 
well. Although a presumption in favor of exclusion arises from police 
illegality or impropriety in procuring evidence, this presumption may 
be displaced after weighing all the circumstances. This approach rec-
ognizes that the interest of society may occasionally predominate over 
those of the individual. 
C. Australia 
Australia's Constitution deals primarily with the division of powers 
between the various States and the Federal Government. It resembles 
the older Canadian format prior to the Charter. Restraints on police 
investigatory powers in Australia may be found in State statutes and in 
49 See TumbuU, 1951 S.L.T. at 411-12. 
50 See Fairley v. London Fishmongers, 1951 S.L.T. 54, 58 (H.C].). 
51 See Hay v. H.M. Advocate, 1968 S.L.T. 334 (H.C].); H.M. Advocate v. McKay, 1961 S.L.T. 174 
(H.C]. Scot.); H.M. Advocate v. Hepper, 1958 S.L.T. 160 (H.CJ.). 
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the common law.52 Throughout most of its history, Australia followed 
the example of English courts concerning the issue of illegally ob-
tained evidence. Until 1978, the English approach governed; although 
a trial judge had discretion to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence, 
he could only do so if its admission would result in unfairness. 
In Bunning v. Cross,53 the Australian High Court broke away from 
the traditional English approach. The Court concluded that not only 
does a trial judge have discretion to exclude evidence which is more 
prejudicial than probative, but that this discretion extends to otherwise 
admissible evidence that was illegally or otherwise improperly obtained 
by the police. The Court did not justiry this discretion based on fairness 
to the individual accused or the need to discipline police. Instead, it 
based its decision on "broader questions of high public policy."54 In 
justifYing the discretion to exclude, the Court expressed its concern 
that by admitting illegally obtained evidence it may appear to be 
condoning or encouraging unlawful police behavior.55 Therefore, ac-
cording to the Court, evidentiary exclusion was required to protect the 
rights of individual citizens. Society's interest in safeguarding individ-
ual rights required such discretion to ensure that, "a citizen's precious 
right to immunity from arbitrary and unlawful intrusion into the daily 
affairs of private life may remain unimpaired. "56 In arriving at this 
conclusion, the Court noted that "truth, like all other good things, may 
be loved unwisely-may be pursued too keenly-may cost too much."57 
The existence of alternative methods for coping with police illegality, 
such as disciplinary, criminal or civil proceedings, did not foreclose the 
Australian High Court from recognizing a discretion to exclude evi-
dence. Despite the existence of other remedies, the power to exclude 
evidence is necessary because otherwise courts would be required to 
tolerate police illegality. "[T] oleration by the courts would result in the 
effective abrogation of the legislature's safeguards of individualliber-
ties, subordinating it to the executive arm. This would not be excusable 
however desirable might be the immediate end in view, that of convict-
ing the guilty."58 
52 See PETER SALLMAN & JOHN WILLIS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AUSTRALIA, ch. 20 (1984). 
53 19 A.L.R. 641 (H.C.1978). 
54 [d. at 659. 
55 [d. 
56 [d. at 661. 
57ld. at 657, quoting Knight Bruce V.C. in Pearse v. Pearse (1846) 63 E.R. 950, 957 (U.K.). 
58 ld. at 661. 
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Against the power to exclude illegally obtained evidence to protect 
individual rights, the Court directed that the public interest in the 
conviction of the guilty must be considered and weighed. 59 In favoring 
a discretionary approach over an automatic rule, the Court empha-
sized the need to maintain respect for the law. "This [respect] can be 
as much damaged by the exclusion of evidence because of some minor 
illegality as by over-ready reception of illegally-obtained evidence."60 As 
a result, the Court enumerated a number of factors to be considered: 
(i) whether the law was deliberately or recklessly violated or whether 
the illegality was unintended or accidental; (ii) whether the illegality 
affected the reliability of the evidence, although this is less important 
in the face of deliberate illegality; (iii) the ease of compliance with the 
law; (iv) the nature of the offense charged; (v) whether statutory pro-
cedures specifically intended to limit the powers of the police were vio-
lated; (vi) the urgency of protecting perishable evidence; and (vii) the 
availability of alternative, equally cogent, evidence.61 
Although the High Court had clearly recognized discretion to ex-
clude illegally or improperly obtained evidence in Bunning, this power 
remained stagnant for twelve years. Arguably this is due to the actual 
disposition in Bunning. Mter applying the balancing test it had articu-
lated, the Court refrained from excluding the illegally obtained evi-
dence at issue. This situation changed in 1990 when the Australian 
High Court employed the discretion articulated in Bunning to exclude 
evidence discovered in a search conducted pursuant to a defective 
warrant.62 A search warrant, based on conclusory statements in an 
affidavit that reasonable grounds for suspicion existed, had been ob-
tained without setting out any grounds to support that conclusion, as 
required by the governing statute. "It seems likely that this holding, 
and particularly its repeated insistence that the terms of the statute 
must be followed, will lead trial judges to be substantially more recep-
tive to the possibility of (discretionary) evidentiary exclusion in future 
cases involving illegal searches."63 
Four important points regarding the Australian approach must be 
remembered. First, the rationale chosen to justifY the rule is significant. 
59 See id. at 657. 
60 Rosemary Pattenden, The Exclusioo of Unfairly Obtained Evidence In England, Canada, and 
Australia, 29 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 664, 674 (1980). 
61 See Bunning V. Cross, 19 A.L.R. 641, 661-63 (H.C. 1978). 
62 See George V. Rockett, 64 A.LJR. 384 (H.C. 1990). 
63 BRADLEY, supra note 21, at 110. 
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The rule is not premised exclusively on deterrence of future police 
illegality. Instead, the Australian High Court emphasized that automat-
ically admitting illegally obtained evidence would be tantamount to a 
tacit condonation of unlawful and improper police practices. Exclusion 
is necessary to safeguard individual liberties by avoiding judicial con-
donation of illegal police practices. 
Second, alternative remedies were deemed unsatisfactory. If the 
court refrained from employing exclusion, then the remedy for the 
violation of individual rights would be left with the executive. This 
result was unacceptable to the court, which refused to be relegated to 
the role of spectator in the process of safeguarding individual liberty. 
Third, in a manner similar to England, the Australians have recog-
nized a power to exclude evidence where police practices violate statu-
tory or common law liberties. Violations of constitutional rights do not 
trigger exclusion; it is violations of regular laws by officials that demand 
an exclusionary remedy. 
Finally, like the English, the Australians have rejected an automatic 
exclusionary rule in favor of a discretionary approach. This position 
recognizes that where an offense is serious and the illegality is technical 
or minor, the public interest should predominate over the interests of 
individual liberty. 
II. BIRTH OF THE AMERICAN EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ITS 
RATIONALE(S) 
Unlike most of the Commonwealth nations, including the three 
considered above, the United States has long had a Constitution which 
delineates specific individual rights and incorporates express limita-
tions on the investigatory powers of the police. Although the original 
Constitution, drafted in 1787, did not address individual rights, this 
deficiency was soon cured by the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in 1791.64 
But the Bill of Rights suffered from one major shortcoming, as Profes-
sor Henkin explains: 
While the Bill of Rights confirms that individual rights are 
not to be abridged by government, the framers did not deem 
it necessary or proper to say how these rights were to be 
64U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. 
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secured against such violation, or what remedies should be 
provided to anyone whose rights had been violated.65 
One might infer that the Framers believed that the system of limited 
government, coupled with a number of checks and balances, would 
safeguard individual rights by preventing a concentration of power. 
This structure, along with the ability to replace elected representatives, 
was viewed as sufficient to protect the interests of individual liberty. 66 
Judicial review of government actions did not become a firmly en-
trenched principle of American constitutional law until Marbury v. 
Madison67 was decided in the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 
this decision,Justice Marshall established the concept of judicial review 
and transformed the courts into what they are today, "the rock and the 
redeemer of our rights."68 
In a criminal law context, however, it would be another hundred 
years before American courts would draw a connection between re-
deeming constitutional rights and the exclusion of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence. Historically, the American approach to unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence was similar to the English approach to 
illegally obtained evidence. Unconstitutional behavior was not viewed 
as a sufficient reason to exclude evidence that was pertinent to the 
issue of guilt. If items were offered into evidence, the court could not 
take notice of how they were obtained or form a collateral issue to 
determine the question. The sole issue for the court was whether the 
evidence tendered was relevant.69 
The United States Supreme Court introduced the exclusionary rule 
to American law through its 1914 decision in Weeks v. United States.70 
65 Louis Henkin, International Human Rights and Rights in the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 25, 36 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984). 
66Id. 
67 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
68 LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 90 (1990). 
69 See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 578-89 (1904). It is important to note that the Adams 
decision was pre-dated by Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the Supreme Court 
had overturned a forfeiture order made against the Boyds, in circumstances where they were 
compelled to produce evidence which proved pivotal to the government's case. See Boyd, 116 U.S. 
at 622, 633-35. The Supreme Court concluded that the document in question was obtained in a 
manner that violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court equated the mandatory production of 
personal papers to be tantamount to the self-incrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. 
On this basis, the document should not have been permitted in evidence. This decision planted 
the seeds for subsequent developments of an exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment 
alone. See id. 
70 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
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A U.S. Marshal, on the heels of an earlier unlawful search by State 
authorities, entered the Weeks' home and conducted a search. The 
Marshal did not have a warrant and was not acting with any legal 
authority. In reversing Weeks' conviction, the Court concluded that the 
search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the defendant's pre-
trial motion for the return of property seized should have been 
granted. Earlier cases that had rejected evidentiary exclusion, as a 
constitutional remedy, were distinguished based on the timing of the 
defendant's motion to exclude. In Weeks, a pre-trial motion had been 
brought and the defendant had not attempted to raise a "collateral 
issue" in the midst of trial. 
In rationalizing the exclusion of evidence, the Court indicated that 
the Fourth Amendment was intended to place clear limitations and 
restraints on the exercise of power by the courts and federal officials. 
The duty to give effect to the Amendment was obligatory and fell to 
those entrusted with the enforcement of law. Violations of constitu-
tional rights "should find no sanction in the judgements of the courts, 
which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, 
and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the 
maintenance of such fundamental rights."71 To admit such evidence, 
the Court concluded, would be tantamount to sanctioning open de-
fiance of the Constitution by law enforcement officials.72 The Court 
refused to perform such a function, as this would be inconsistent with 
its obligation to give effect to the Fourth Amendment. 
Unfortunately, the Court in Weeks did not explicitly identifY the 
rationale underlying the exclusionary rule it had created.73 It is readily 
apparent that deterrence of future unconstitutional behavior was not 
an expressed motivation for the rule. Yet, despite the lack of clarity, 
two bases for the decision can be discerned. The first is the notion that 
the Fourth Amendment itself precludes the court from admitting the 
evidence. Without exclusion, the Fourth Amendment would have no 
value and "might as well be stricken from the Constitution. "74 The 
second is the view expressed by the court that admitting the evidence 
would be equal to sanctioning the violation of the Constitution. This 
latter consideration was undoubtedly linked to a more general concern 
71 Id. at 392. 
72 See id. at 394. 
73 See UVILLER, supra note 21, at 65. 
74 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393. 
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regarding the integrity of the courts and the perception that would be 
created if the evidence were admitted. 
Theoretically, Weeks was a significant decision, with its introduction 
of an exclusionary rule to American law. From a practical standpoint, 
however, the decision only affected federal prosecutions.75 The Fourth 
Amendment was not yet applicable to the States.76 But the Fourteenth 
Amendment loomed in the background and by the 1930s was a firmly 
entrenched mechanism for making provisions in the Bill of Rights 
applicable to the States.77 This is exactly what occurred in relation to 
the Fourth Amendment in 1949. 
In Wolf v. Colorado,78 the Supreme Court concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment's guarantee was essential to any free society and implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty. The Fourth Amendment was first 
made applicable to the States through this decision, but the Court 
refrained from making the exclusionary rule mandatory in State pro-
ceedings. The rule ''was not derived from the explicit requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment; it was not based on legislation expressing 
Congressional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution . . . [it 
was] a matter of judicial implication."79 The Court emphasized that 
other English speaking nations had rejected the rule, as had thirty-one 
of the forty-seven States which had considered it. In the States which 
rejected the rule, other remedies existed, including damages, criminal 
prosecutions, internal police discipline, and contempt proceedings.80 
In light of the varied State approaches, evidentiary exclusion was not 
viewed as an essential ingredient of the Fourth Amendment, therefore 
the Due Process Clause did not mandate its application to the States.81 
75 See Katz, supra note 9, at 115. 
76 See Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71,76 (1855) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply to the States, given that the Bill of Rights only applied as a restriction on federal 
powers, citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)). 
77 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65-68 (1932), empltrying Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 
516 (1884). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel was a fundamental provision in the Bill of 
Rights and was incorporated within the Due Process Clause, making it applicable to the States. 
Some members of the Supreme Court would have taken a more progressive approach, holding 
that the Due Process Clause made the entirety of the Bill of Rights applicable to the States. See 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,174-75 (1947) (Black,]., dissenting), but this position has 
never won over a majority of the Court. 
78 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). 
79Id. at 28. 
80 See id. at 29-3l. 
81 Three dissenters held that the exclusionary rule must be applied to the States: Justice 
Rutledge wrote that without the exclusionary rule the Fourth Amendment might as well be 
stricken from the Constitution; Justice Murphy wrote that alternative remedies were ineffective 
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The Wolf decision appeared to clarifY the rationale underlying the 
federal exclusionary rule. The rule reflected one of several possible 
and permissible options for remedying Fourth Amendment violations. 
The rule was not mandated by the Fourth Amendment. Weeks should 
not be read as though the exclusionary rule was required by the 
Constitution. The rule amounted to a judicially created remedy, noth-
ing more. But in the period following Wolf, the Supreme Court ap-
peared uneasy with the notion that Federal courts could never review 
State decisions admitting evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.82 
In Rochin v. California,83 the Court was confronted with a search by 
state officials which had undoubtedly violated the defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights. Police, without legal justification, burst into Ro-
chin's bedroom, used force in an effort to prevent him from swallowing 
some capsules, and when unsuccessful, forcibly had his stomach pump-
ed at the hospital. The Court ruled that the evidence derived from this 
process should have been excluded, not under the Fourth Amend-
ment, but pursuant to the Due Process Clause. Due process, the Court 
held, required that evidence be excluded if obtained in a manner that 
shocks the conscience, offends a sense of justice, or runs counter to 
the decencies of civilized conduct.84 
Unfortunately, Rochin set an ambiguous standard for federal review, 
which created difficulty in subsequent application. The decision fueled 
a series of conflicting decisions and caused confusion concerning the 
federal court's residual power to exclude evidence under the Due 
Process Clause.85 This discretionary approach lacked clear criteria nec-
essary to ensure consistency in application.86 The process of grappling 
with an unruly standard for federal review appears to have provided 
the impetus to reconsider Wolf. 
In Mapp v. Ohio,87 the Supreme Court, without any prompting from 
Mapp's counsel, overturned its decision in WOlf.88 The Court held that 
and only the exclusionary rule would deter violations of the Fourth Amendment; and Justice 
Douglas wrote that the rule must be applied otherwise there would be no effective sanction. See 
id. at 40-48. 
82 See Brent, supra note 22, at 21. 
83 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
84 See id. at 172-73. 
85 See, e.g .• Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1953); 
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 63 (1953). 
86 Brent, supra note 22, at 22. 
87 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
88 See id. at 646 n.3. Mapp's counsel did not argue the case on the basis that Wolf should be 
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the exclusionary rule was applicable to the States. In distinguishing 
Wolf, the Court reasoned that the decision was bottomed on the factual 
circumstances which had since changed. First, in the ensuing period, 
more than half of the States which had considered the exclusionary 
rule chose to wholly or partly adopt it. Second, citing the experience 
in California and other States, the Court concluded that alternative 
remedies had proven ineffective.89 
In his decision, Justice Clark echoed what had been stated a year 
earlier in Elkins v. United States. 90 The purpose of the exclusionary rule 
"is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the 
only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard 
it. "91 The Court, however, still had to rationalize its conclusion, insisting 
that the exclusionary rule was an essential part of both the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.92 In explaining this conclusion, Justice Clark 
acknowledged other justifications for the exclusionary rule beyond 
deterrence. 
First, Justice Clark indicated that an opposite holding would reduce 
the Fourth Amendment to a "form of words." He claimed that this 
would be the equivalent of granting a right, while in reality withholding 
its privilege and enjoyment.93 On this view, the exclusionary rule had 
its foundation in the Constitution. Second,Justice Clark reasoned that 
a contrary holding would invite State officials to violate the Constitu-
tion.94 The language used appears to repeat the deterrence rationale, 
exclusion is needed as a disincentive to future unconstitutional behav-
ior. Finally, the integrity of both the judiciary and the government were 
cited to justifY the rule. With respect to the judiciary, Justice Clark 
indicated that convictions through unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence should find no sanction in the judgments of the Court.95 The 
reason was, as explained by a later quote from Elkins, "the imperative 
overturned, instead he focused on the constitutionality of the offense with which Mapp was 
charged. Only the American Civil Liberties Union, in its amicus brief, requested that Wolfbe 
overturned. See id. 
B9 See id. at 651-54. 
9°364 U.S. 206 (1960). The Court overturned the "silver platter" doctrine. The doctrine had 
permitted State officials who violated the Constitution in a State investigation to turn over 
evidence of federal crimes so obtained to federal authorities. The latter were then permitted to 
use the evidence in a federal prosecution. See id. 
91 Mapp, 367 U.s. at 656, quoting Elkins, 364 U.s. at 217. 
92 See id. at 656-57. 
93 See id. at 655-56. 
94 See id. at 658. 
95 See id. at 648, citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 
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of judicial integrity."96 In discussing the concept of governmental in-
tegrity, Justice Clark cautioned, 
[n] othing can destroy a government more quickly than its 
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the 
charter of its own existence .... "Our Government is the 
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches 
the whole people by its example .... If the Government be-
comes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every 
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."97 
The varied rationales offered for the rule by Justice Clark were not 
concurred with by a majority of the Justices. 98 In this fashion, the 
decision repeated a trend which had marked the early decisions that 
gave birth to the exclusionary rule. "In fact, no decision by the Court 
has ever fully explored the possible alternative doctrinal bases for the 
rule, and the justifications for the rule seem to have changed subtly 
over time-usually without any explicit recognition by the Justices in-
volved."99 
A review of the seminal decisions giving rise to the exclusionary rule 
reveals varying theories justifYing its use. The theories fall into three 
general categories: (1) exclusion is directly mandated by the Constitu-
tion; (2) exclusion is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judiciary 
or the government; and (3) exclusion is a constitutionally required 
remedy, necessary for the purpose of deterring future constitutional 
violations. lOo 
96 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,659-60 (1961), quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222. 
97Id. at 659, quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis,]., dissent-
ing). 
98 Justices Black & Douglas concurred in the result, but offered differing reasons which did not 
embrace all of Clark's reasons. See id. at 660, 666. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurter 
and Whittaker, dissented. See id. at 672. 
99 Stewart, supra note 10, at 1372. 
100 See id. at 1380. The author outlines the various decisions, or portions of decisions, that 
support each rationale. See id. at 1380-84. Cases supporting the proposition that exclusion is 
mandated by the Constitution include: Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651, 655-57; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 
462-63; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1925); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 
298,313 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); Weeks,232 
U.S. at 391-93. Cases supporting the proposition that exclusion is mandated to preserve the 
integrity of the court or the government include: Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659-60; Elkins, 364 U.S. at 
222; and Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469-71. Cases supporting the proposition that exclusion is a 
constitutionally required remedy necessary to deter future constitutional violations include: 
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648; Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217. 
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Determining a definitive rationale for the exclusionary rule has not 
proven possible. Given that varied reasons have been offered to justifY 
the rule, both in the United States and in other jurisdictions, focusing 
on a single rationale seems overly simplistic. Remarkably, in the wake 
of Mapp, a number of decisions identified deterrence as the sole 
rationale underlying the rule and either discounted or ignored other 
equally compelling justifications. The genesis of this development 
comes from a few cases decided during the 1960s involving 
the vexing question of retroactivity .... In Linkletter v. Walker, 
the Court declared that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 
was to deter and refused to make the Mapp doctrine retroac-
tive on the basis that to do so would not have a deterrent 
effect. 101 
The deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule gained increasing 
preeminence during the era of the Burger Court. 
Prior to being appointed to the Supreme Court, Warren Burger was 
one of the most vocal critics of the Warren Court's criminal procedure 
revolution.102 Therefore, it is not surprising that once appointed he 
became the most ardent judicial opponent of the exclusionary rule, 
calling for the rule's abolition in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents.103 What 
is surprising is the Chief Justice's assertion in Bivens that "[ i] t is clear 
... the exclusionary rule has rested on the deterrent rationale."104 This 
claim is astonishing because seven years earlier the Chief Justice had 
written that, "[t]he Weeks holding ... rested on the Court's unwilling-
ness to give even tacit approval to official defiance of constitutional 
provisions by admitting evidence secured in violation of the Constitu-
tion. The idea of deterrence may be lurking between the lines of the 
opinion but [it] is not expressed. "105 
The gradual march towards transforming deterrence into the sole 
rationale for the exclusionary rule culminated in United States v. Ca-
landra.106 A majority of the Court adopted the position that the exclu-
sionary rule "is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, 
101 Steven Cann & Bob Egbert, The Exclusionary Rule: Its Necessity in Constitutional Democracy, 
23 How. LJ. 299, 305 (1980); see also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965). 
102LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 195 (1983). 
103 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). 
104 Id. at 415. 
105Warren Burger, Who Will Watch The Watchman, 14 AM. U. L. REv. 1,5 (1964). 
106 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
1999] EXCLUSIONARY RULE DEBATE 101 
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."107 
Since deciding Calandra, the Supreme Court has consistently reiter-
ated that deterrence is the "primary justification for the exclusionary 
rule. "108 While transforming deterrence into the principle justification 
for the rule, the Court simultaneously employed this limited rationale 
to narrow the scope of the rule's applicability. In Calandra, the Court 
explicitly acknowledged a cost-benefit analysis applicable in determin-
ing whether the exclusionary rule should be applied. 109 If deterrence 
was the rule's purpose, then the trial court should weigh the cost of 
excluding evidence from a particular proceeding against the incre-
mental deterrent benefit achieved from exclusion. If the court deter-
mined that the cost outweighed the benefit, the rule should not be 
applied.110 
Mter applying the cost-benefit analysis in Calandra, the Court deter-
mined that the exclusionary rule should not preclude the use of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence in grand jury proceedings. De-
terrence was sufficiently advanced by excluding such evidence at trial; 
no additional deterrent benefit was derived from preventing the grand 
jury from hearing the evidence. Since Calandra was decided, the cost-
benefit analysis has consistently been used in a variety of circumstances 
to either narrow the scope of the exclusionary rule or to refuse its 
extension. lll 
107 [d. at 348. 
108 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600 
(1975) ('The rule is calculated to prevent not to repair. Its purpose is to deter."), citing Elkins, 
364 U.S. at 217; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) ("the deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule"). 
109 This approach was implicit in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969).Justice 
White, delivering the majority opinion, suggested that the applicability of the exclusionary rule 
would turn on a balancing of the costs and benefits of exclusion. See id. 
110 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349. 
III See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 1193-94 (1995) (the exclusionary rule was not 
applied where a police officer, relying on an erroneous computer entry, arrested the defendant 
on an outstanding warrant--due to a clerical error by court staff an arrest warrant that had been 
revoked remained registered in the computer system, there would be no deterrent benefit in 
applying the rule as exclusion would not deter future clerical errors by court staff who are not 
adjuncts to law enforcement); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-55 (1987) (the exclusionary rule 
should not be applied when police have relied on a statute that they did not know to be 
unconstitutional, as there is no deterrent benefit to be derived when police act in good faith 
reliance on a law they have no reason to believe is unconstitutional); Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040-50 (1984) (the exclusionary rule does not 
apply to deportation proceedings, the court concluded that the deterrent benefit of excluding 
the evidence would be outweighed by its costs-immigration officials would not be deterred given 
the unlikelihood of deportees raising exclusionary rule claims); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
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In focusing on the deterrent aspect of the exclusionary rule and 
emphasizing the cost-benefit analysis, the Burger Court effectively nar-
rowed the thrust of the rule.1 12 Although the court has managed to 
shift the rule's focus to deterrence, it has been unable to convincingly 
explain these developments in light of earlier pronouncements empha-
sizing judicial integrity. For instance, in Terry v. Ohio,113 after noting 
the deterrent benefits of the rule, the Supreme Court proceeded to 
emphasize the judicial integrity rationale in the strongest of terms, 
indicating: 
The rule also serves another vital function-"the imperative 
of judicial integrity" .... Courts which sit under our Consti-
tution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions 
of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhin-
dered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. Thus 
in our system evidentiary rulings provide the context in which 
the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some 
conduct as comporting with constitutional guarantees and 
disapproves other actions by state agents. A ruling admitting 
evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary 
effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evi-
dence, while an application of the exclusionary rule with-
holds the constitutional imprimatur. 1l4 
897, 919-22 (1984) (the exclusionary rule should no longer be applied where police officers 
acted in good faith, pursuant to a deficient search warrant; the reason, the magistrates who sign 
the warrants are responsible for any errors and they will not be deterred by the exclusion of 
evidence); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980) (unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence could be used to impeach the credibility of the victim of an unlawful search, as the 
deterrent benefit of the exclusionary rule was sufficiently served by excluding the evidence from 
the prosecution's case in chief); Stane, 428 U.S. at 474-95 (state prisoners may not seek habeas 
review in Federal courts on the ground that unconstitutionally obtained evidence had been 
introduced at trial, as no additional deterrent benefit is achieved where the issue has already 
been fully litigated in State courts); United States v.Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 457-58 (1976) (refusing 
to apply rule in federal tax proceedings to evidence unconstitutionally seized by state police 
officer, deterrent purpose would not be served as unlikely that officer would have foreseen this 
potential use of the evidence); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (refusing to give 
retroactive application to earlier Fourth Amendment decision, based on conclusion that doing 
so would not have a deterrent benefit); United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1260-63 (2d Cir. 
1992) (exclusionary rule inapplicable at sentencing hearings, the benefit of providing sentencing 
judges with full information outweighed the likelihood that admission would encourage unlawful 
police conduct). 
112 Yale Kamisar, The "Police Practice" Phase of the Criminal Process and the Three Phases of the 
Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS 143, 161-63 (H. Schwartz ed., 1987). 
113 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
114Id. at 12-13. 
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The Supreme Court has made an ineffective attempt to explain the 
increased emphasis on deterrence, and discount the importance of 
judicial integrity. The Court's claim that judicial integrity "has limited 
force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence" 
is not convincing. ll5 This is particularly so in light of the emphasis 
placed on judicial integrity in earlier decisions such as Terry, and the 
fact that deterrence does not exclusively ground the exclusionary rule 
in other democratic nations, like England, Scotland or Australia.116 "It 
is difficult to resist the conclusion that, like a pack of hungry wolves, 
Supreme Court Justices, unconvinced of the merits of exclusion, sepa-
rated the most vulnerable rationale from the herd of rationales for the 
purpose of savaging it."117 This view has even been shared by some 
American jurists, who have questioned the real motivation underlying 
the Supreme Court's increased emphasis on deterrence. lls 
In reducing the purpose of the rule down to a question of deter-
rence, the Supreme Court has effectively redefined the debate sur-
rounding the exclusionary rule. The present debate focuses around 
"the precise constitutional status of the exclusionary rule and, in par-
ticular, whether Congress could place significant limitations upon the 
rule or even abolish it entirely by providing some other remedy in its 
place."119 It is to this debate which we now turn. 
III. THE CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN EXCLUSIONARY RULE DEBATE 
The debate surrounding the exclusionary rule has been ongoing in 
the United States since the Weeks decision. Critics of the exclusionary 
rule have included such esteemed figures as Professor Wigmore, who 
lamented that" [0] ur way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike 
at the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke 
something else. "120 The frustration of critics is summarized best in 
115 Stone, 428 U.S. at 485. 
116 Similarly, the Canadian exclusionary rule is not premised on deterrence. Canadian devel-
opments, however, will be addressed below. 
117 David M. Paciocco, The Judicial Repeal of § 24(2) and the Deuelopment of the Canadian 
Exclusionary Rule, 32 CRlM. L.Q. 326, 336 (1990). The Canadian commentator made this obser-
vation in relation to the American experience. See id. 
118 See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 561-62 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[I]f a 
majority of my colleagues are determined to discard the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment 
cases, they should forthrightly do so, and be done with it .... [Covert erosion] demeans the 
adjudicatory function, and the institutional integrity of this Court."). 
119WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 19 
(1987). 
120 DEAN J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2183 n.64 (1961). 
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Justice Cardozo's observation that, "[t]he criminal is to go free because 
the constable has blundered. "121 
It is not my purpose to revisit the historical debate surrounding the 
exclusionary rule, or to canvass all of the arguments that have been 
put forward on both sides. To this "little of value can be added. "122 
Arguably, the historical debate is capable of being encapsulated into 
seven general criticisms and responses: 
1) Criticism-The criminal is to go free because the constable has 
blundered. 123 
Respons~riminals do not go free because the constable blun-
dered, but rather because official compliance with the requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment makes it more difficult to catch criminals. 
It is not the exclusionary rule but the Fourth Amendment which 
imposes a cost in lost convictions. 124 
2) Criticism-The exclusionary rule serves to handcuff the police in 
their legitimate and important effort to enforce the criminal law. 125 
Response-It is the constitutional rule, not the exclusionary sanction, 
which imposes limits on the operation of the police. If the police abide 
by the Constitution, there would be no evidence to exclude. The 
exclusionary rule, by definition, operates only after incriminating evi-
dence has been obtained and flaunts before us the costs we must pay 
for constitutional safeguards. 126 
3) Criticism-The exclusionary rule does not provide a remedy for 
innocent persons who are the victims of unconstitutional conduct. The 
rule exclusively serves to benefit the guilty.127 
Response-The Fourth Amendment protects everyone against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. The exclusionary rule inures to the 
benefit of all by decreasing the likelihood that anyone, "innocent" or 
"guilty," will be subjected to an unconstitutional search or seizure. In 
this fashion, individual liberty is benefited on a general level by the 
rule. 128 
121 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). 
122Id. 
123 Id. 
124 See Stewart, supra note 10, at 1392-93; Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the 
Fuurth Amendment Exclusiunary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1,44,47 (1987); United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 941 (1984) (Brennan,]., dissenting). 
125LAFAVE, supra note 119, at 22. 
126John Kaplan, The Limits Of The Exclusiunary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1037 (1974). 
127MALCOLM R. WILKEY, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT By ALTERNATIVES TO THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 12 (1982). 
128 See Cann & Egbert, supra note 101, at 312; Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and 
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5) Criticism-Suppression motions, in which defendants seek the 
benefit of the exclusionary rule, unnecessarily shift the focus of the 
trial away from the defendants' guilt or innocence. These hearings are 
costly and distract judges from other important matters. Finally, the 
court is not the proper forum to discipline police officers for their 
unconstitutional activities. 129 
Response-Courts should be preoccupied with the manner in which 
evidence has been obtained, otherwise the Constitution's guarantees 
would be rendered meaningless. It is the courts that must assume the 
role of being the final arbiters of individual rights. Absent such judicial 
scrutiny, constitutional violations would go unnoticed. Similarly, with-
out continual judicial review, the Constitution's guarantees would re-
main unarticulated and rarely defined. The Constitution would only 
be expounded in rare actions for assault, trespass and false imprison-
ment, and prosecutions for resisting arrest or obstructing the police in 
the execution of their dUty.130 
6) Criticism-The exclusionary rule confers a disproportionate ben-
efit on a defendant. A relatively minor violation of the Constitution 
results in the exclusion of evidence and necessitates that a guilty de-
fendant go free. This windfall is contrary to the idea of proportionality 
that is essential to the concept of justice.131 
Response-This criticism is only significant if one conceives the pur-
pose of the rule to be compensation of the individual victim. 132 If the 
compensation rationale is used, however, the criticism remains inaccu-
rate. A number of exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been 
created to ensure that all that is excluded is the evidence the police 
would not have found had they abided by the Constitution. The exclu-
sionary rule does not confer immunity on a defendant against future 
prosecution; it simply restores him to the position he would have 
occupied had his constitutional rights not been violated. 133 
the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering , 48 IND. LJ. 329, 330-31 (1973), quoted in Kamisar, 
supra note 124, at 30; Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment is a Device for Protecting the 
Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1229 (1983); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) 
Uackson, J., dissenting). 
129 See WILKEY, supra note 127, at 14-17. 
130 See Brent, supra note 22, at 9. 
131 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Richard A. Posner, 
Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REv. 635 (1982). 
132 See Stewart, supra note 10, at 1396. 
133The exclusionary rule reaches evidence which is derived from the primary constitutional 
violation. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984). Exceptions exist, however, to ensure 
that a defendant does not benefit from an undue windfall. Therefore, evidence which was 
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7) Criticism-The exclusionary rule in the United States is anoma-
lous; other democratic nations do not employ an exclusionary rule and 
they are arguably as free as the United States.134 
Responslr-The United States is not alone in employing an exclusion-
ary rule; a number of nations use exclusion of evidence as a means to 
safeguard individual rights. For instance, England, Scotland, Ireland, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Germany and France all have some 
form of an exclusionary rule. 135 
More pertinent for our purposes is the contemporary debate sur-
rounding the exclusionary rule. As noted above, it has been defined 
by two developments: the Supreme Court's ever increasing empha-
sis on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule and the cost-
benefit analysis that the Supreme Court has developed in determining 
whether the exclusionary rule should be expanded into new areas, or 
whether its present application should be further restricted. Due to 
these developments, the focus of the debate has narrowed significantly 
over the last twenty years. The current debate is marked by increasing 
studies into the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule and the cost 
it exacts in lost prosecutions. 
A number of studies have been conducted to evaluate the deterrent 
effect of the exclusionary rule. 136 There is a complete absence of con-
sistency in the findings of the various studies. Some studies concluded 
obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable from the underlying illegality that is purged of the 
primary taint remains admissible. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Similarly, 
evidence obtained through an independent source who is not connected to the Government's 
own wrong or illegality remains admissible. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988); 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). In addition, if the evidence would 
inevitably have been discovered by lawful means, it remains admissible. See Nix v. Williams, 467 
U.S. 431 (1984); Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943). 
134 See Malcolm R. Wilkey, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REv. 659, 660 (1972); Bivens, 
403 U.S. at 415 (Burger, Cl, dissenting); Oaks, supra note 12, at 701-06. 
135 See Brent, supra note 22; Dawson, supra note 5; MacDougall, supra note 21; Williams, supra 
note 5; Baldiga, supra note 9; Yeo, supra note 5; Pattenden, supra note 60; Peiris, supra note 5; 
Craig M. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule In Germany, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1032 (1983); BARTON L. 
INGRAHAM, THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, LAws AND PRACTICE OF FRANCE, THE 
SOVIET UNION, CHINA, AND THE UNITED STATES 66 (1995). 
136 See Myron W. Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of aicago 
Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016 (1987); Bradley Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have 
Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979); S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLU-
SIONARY INJUSTICE 50-56 (1977); Yale Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatu-
ral" Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 67 (1978); James E. Spiotto, Search 
and Seizure: American Empirical Studies of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 243 (1973); Oaks, supra note 12; Stuart S. Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding IllegaUy 
Seized Evidence, WIS. L. REv. 283 (1965). 
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that the rule has been an effective deterrent,137 while others find that 
the deterrent benefits have been marginal at best.13s Some studies even 
conclude that the rule has no deterrent benefit whatsoever. 139 "Despite 
... years of sustained discussion with statistics in hand, we still do not 
know the answer to the question 'does it or does it not deter?"'140 The 
increased emphasis on deterrence, coupled with the cost-benefit ap-
proach, has caused some commentators to express concern over the 
future of the exclusionary rule. 141 This apprehension is undoubtedly 
fueled by the Supreme Court's explicit recognition that "[n]o empiri-
cal researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet been able 
to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a deterrent effect 
even in the situations in which it is now applied."142 At present, the 
Supreme Court is simply indulging a presumption in favor of deter-
rence, "[d]espite the absence of supportive empirical evidence."143 A 
valid fear exists that the Supreme Court might eventually refuse to 
continue indulging this presumption and do away with the exclusion-
ary rule on this basis.l44 
Although the deterrent benefit of the exclusionary rule is not clear, 
studies evaluating the cost of the exclusionary rule in lost convictions 
are more conclusive.145 In Leon, the Court conducted an extensive 
review of the various studies and concluded that, 
[the] cumulative loss due to nonprosecution or nonconvic-
tion ofindividuals arrested on felony drug charges is probably 
137 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 136; Kamisar, supra note 136. 
138 See Oaks, supra note 12; Canon, supra note 136. 
139 Spiotto, supra note 136. 
l4o\Ves-Marie Morissette, The Exclusion of Evidence Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms: What To Do and What Not To Do, 29 MCGILL LJ. 521, 533 (1984). The author makes 
this comment after reviewing the debate in the United States regarding the American exclusion-
ary rule. See id. 
141 KA. Faibi, The Exclusionary Rule: Not the "Expressed Juice of the Whoolly-Headed Thistle, " 35 
BUFF. L. REv. 937, 939 n.ll (1986). 
142Janis, 428 U.S. at 453 n.22. 
143 Stone, 428 U.S. at 492. 
144 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 365 (Brennan,]., dissenting) ("I am left with the uneasy feeling 
that today's decision may signal that a majority of my colleagues have positioned themselves to 
reopen the door still further and abandon altogether the exclusionary rule in search and seizure 
cases.") 
145 See Caldwell & Chase, supra note 14, at 50-51; Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the 
Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 2 U. ILL. L. REv. 223 (1987); Thomas Davies, A Hard 
Look At What We Know (And Still Need To Know) About the Costs of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ 
Study and Other Studies of Lost Arrests, AM. B. FOUND. REs.]. 611; James]. Fyfe, The NIJ Study of 
the Exclusionary Rule, 19 CRlM. L. BULL. 253 (1983). 
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in the range of 2.8% to 7.1 % .... [California] data suggests 
that screening by police and prosecutors results in the release 
because of illegal searches or seizures of as many as 1.4% of 
all felony arrestees, ... that 0.9% of all felony arrestees are 
released, because of illegal searches and seizures, at the pre-
liminary hearing or after trial, ... and that roughly 0.5% of 
all felony arrestees benefit from reversals on appeal because 
of illegal searches. l46 
When the percentages are converted into actual numbers the sig-
nificant impact of the exclusionary rule becomes more apparent. 
Roughly "30,000 cases were dismissed nationwide in one year because 
of the exclusionary rule."147 
Empirical studies on the exclusionary rule have had a profound 
effect on the debate surrounding the rule. Because the deterrent 
benefits of the rule are inconclusive, while the costs of its application 
are readily apparent, a number of commentators have advocated that 
the rule be abolished and replaced with a more effective and less costly 
remedy.148 Similarly, a number of Supreme Court justices have sug-
gested that the rule be replaced, foremost among them Chief Justice 
Burger. 149 
In Bivens, the Chief Justice did not "question the need for some 
remedy to give meaning and teeth to the constitutional guarantees 
against unlawful conduct by government officials. "150 He did suggest, 
however, that Congress replace the rule with some more effective 
alternative remedy, given the absence of empirical evidence to support 
146United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984). 
147BRADLEY, supra note 21, at 43. 
148 See Robert M. Hardaway, Equivalent Deterrence: A Proposed Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule 
in Criminal Proceedings, 11 CRIM. JUST. j. 357 (1989); Malcolm R. Wilkey, Constitutional Alterna-
tives to the Exclusionary Rule, 23 S. Thx. LJ. 530 (1982); Aloysius T. Webster, Protecting Society's 
Rights While Preserving Fourth Amendment Protections: An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule, 23 
S. Thx. LJ. 693 (1982); William A Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives 
to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. LJ. 1361 (1981); Raymond G. Hall & Cheryl Dempsey, The 
Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 3 CRIM. JUST. j. 303 (1980); Spiotto, supra note 136. 
149 Chief Justice Burger repeated his attack on the exclusionary rule in a number of decisions. 
See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465 (1976) (Burger, CJ., concurring). But Chief Justice Burger did not always stand alone. See 
California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916 (1979) (Renqhuist,j., dissenting); Stone, 428 U.S. at 537-42. 
(White, j., dissenting); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 612 (1975) (Powell & Rehnquist, lJ., 
concurring); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 510 (1971) (Blackmun,j., concurring 
with Burger CJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
150 403 U.S. at 415 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). 
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the claim that the rule actually deters police illegality.151 The Chief 
Justice then made a specific proposal, "an administrative or quasijudi-
cial remedy against the government itself to afford compensation and 
restitution for persons whose Fourth Amendment rights have been 
violated. "152 
Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Bivens, coupled with the 
ever increasing emphasis on the deterrent purpose of the rule, has 
generated Congressional activity on the subject of the exclusionary 
rule. Congress has made repeated attempts to replace the rule with 
some legislated alternative, but none of the proposed bills have be-
come law. 153 These efforts to replace the exclusionary rule are premised 
on a number of assumptions, including: (i) the rule is not required by 
the Constitution; (ii) the rule's only purpose is deterrence; (iii) the 
rule is an ineffective deterrent; and (iv) some alternative remedy 
would be more effective in deterring police illegality and would not 
exact the same toll in lost convictions. 
Critics of the exclusionary rule tend to advocate one, or a combina-
tion of three, alternative remedies. They assert that these remedies 
would be just as effective as the exclusionary rule in deterring police 
illegality. The remedies include: (i) civil damages for those aggrieved 
by unconstitutional behavior; (ii) prosecution of the individual officers 
who violate an individual's constitutional rights; and (iii) internal, or 
even external, disciplinary proceedings against the officers involved.154 
The effectiveness of these respective remedies will be considered when 
the Canadian experience prior to the Charter is addressed. 
Critics of the rule, who suggest that alternative remedies should be 
implemented, tend to focus on the cost in lost convictions that the 
exclusionary rule exacts. It is curious that these same critics suggest 
that their proposed remedies would equally, or even more effectively, 
deter police illegality. If critics are correct about their proposals, the 
police will abide by the Constitution, in which case the cost will be 
exactly the same as it is under the exclusionary rule. The only differ-
151 See id. at 416. 
152Id. at 422. 
153 See MacDougall, supra note 21, at 661 n.335; see also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON 
VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 55 (released August 17, 1981) (advocating abolition of the rule); 
Kenneth Jost, A Ow,nging Legal Landscape: Anti-Crime and Tart &form Proposals Likely to Fluurish 
in GOP Congress, 81 A.BA.]. 18 (1995) (bill sponsored by Senator Hatch pending in the Senate; 
it would serve to abrogate the exclusionary rule and replace it with a fortified tort remedy). 
154 See Stewart, supra note 10, at 1386 (the author reviews each proposal and the criticisms 
offered against each). 
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ence is that an effective alternative remedy "would not 'rub our noses' 
in the Fourth Amendment the way the exclusionary rule does."155 
The contemporary debate regarding the exclusionary rule is directly 
linked to the decisions that first established the rule. "None of the 
three Supreme Court cases credited with producing the rule focused 
on whether the exclusionary rule, as we know it, should exist-yet 
somehow, in 1914, after all three cases had been decided, the rule was 
established. "156 The absence of a clear rationale for the rule allowed 
the Burger Court to focus on deterrence to such an extent that the 
rule's sole justification has been transformed into the greatest threat 
to its continued applicability.157 
The American debate has thus been reduced to a question of deter-
rence. This has positioned the combatants in the debate in two dia-
metrically opposed positions, those who claim the rule deters and 
should be retained versus those who claim the rule is an ineffective 
deterrent and should be abolished. There is no middle ground in this 
debate. In drafting the Charter, Canada had the benefit of considering 
the American approach. In an effort to avoid repeating the American 
experience, the Framers of the Charter specifically incorporated a pro-
vision into the text addressing the issue of what should be done with 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. 
IV. BIRTH OF CANADIAN EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ITS RATIONALE 
Historically, Canada had long taken the position that the means by 
which evidence had been obtained were irrelevant to admissibility.158 
In 1960, a real prospect existed that this position might change with 
the enactment ofthe Canadian Bill of Rights.159 Canada's Constitution, 
enacted in 1867, had not contained a bill of rights. In the post-war era, 
Canada grew increasingly dissatisfied with the absence of a codified 
instrument setting out basic rights and freedoms.16o But the response 
to this disenchantment was not constitutional reform. Instead, the 
Canadian Bill of Rights was an ordinary act of the Federal Parliament. 
155Kamisar, supra note 124, at 47. 
156Stewart, supra note 10, at 1372. 
157 See Lane V. Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 141, 148 (1978) (" [T] he failure of the earlier cases to clearly articulate 
a constitutional basis for those decisions led to this drift. ") . 
158 See R. v. Doyle, 12 O.R. 347, 353 (CA. 1886) (Can.). 
159 Can. Bill of Rights Act, R.S.C. 1970, app. III. 
160 PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF CANADA 639 (1985). 
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Despite this deficiency, the Canadian Bill of Rights incorporated a 
number of provisions that attempted to ensure fair treatment for indi-
viduals who were detained in relation to, or charged with, a crime.161 
The Canadian Bill of Rights did not address how the courts should 
deal with evidence that had been obtained in violation of its provisions. 
Early decisions under the Act suggested that evidentiary exclusion 
might automatically flow from a violation. 162 These developments, how-
ever, were short-lived. The Supreme Court eventually rejected eviden-
tiary exclusion to remedy violations of the Bill of Rights.163 Instead, the 
Court clung to the conventional common law rule; evidence remained 
admissible no matter how it was obtained, even if the Bill of Rights had 
been violated in the investigative process.164 
In 1971, wholly apart from the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court of 
Canada reconsidered the scope of judicial discretion to exclude ille-
gally obtained evidence.165 The Court articulated a more restrictive 
position than that taken by the Privy Council in Kuruma. Evidence 
could be excluded if admission would unfairly affect the accused. 
Unfairness, however, would only arise if the evidence was gravely preju-
dicial, its admissibility tenuous, and its probative value slight.166 This 
rule was "diametrically opposite the American position and radically 
divergent from the British. [In effect,] [n] 0 discretion existed to ex-
clude illegally obtained evidence. "167 
American critics of the exclusionary rule, quick to point out the 
benefits of a justice system without such a rule, regularly made refer-
ence to Canadian law during this period.168 At the time, theoretically, 
161 See, e.g., R.S.C. 1970 § 1 (a) (right to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of 
property); § 2(c) (ii) (right upon arrest or detention to retain and instruct counsel without delay); 
§ 2(d) (protection against self-incrimination); § 2(e) (right to a fair hearing in accordance with 
the principles of fundamental justice). Note that the Canadian Bill of Rights did not incorporate 
a provision limiting the search and seizure powers of police, but these powers were circumscribed 
by a number of common law rules. 
162See R. v. Gray, 132 C.C.C. 337 (B.C. Provo Ct. 1962) (evidence excluded); R. v. Ballegeer, 3 
C.C.C. 353 (Man. CA. 1969) (conviction overturned as evidence obtained contrary to Bill of 
Right wrongfully admitted). 
163 See R. v. Hogan [1975) 2 S.C.R. 547, 584 ("I cannot agree that, wherever there has been a 
breach of one of the provisions of that Bill, it justifies the adoption of the rule of 'absolute 
exclusion' on the American model which is in derogation of the common law rule long accepted 
in this country."). 
164 See Katz, supra note 9, at 120. 
165R. v. Wray [1971) S.C.R. 272 (defendant's confession involuntary and excluded pursuant to 
common law, but physical evidence the defendant located for police admitted). 
166 See id. at 293. 
167Brent, supra note 22, at 17. 
168 See Caldwell & Chase, supra note 14, at 60-62; Shanks, supra note 13, at 663-66. 
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there were three bases for redress by an individual whose rights were 
violated by police. An aggrieved individual could "sue the police for 
damages incurred, complain or demand disciplinary action or the 
laying of criminal charges. "169 American critics of the exclusionary rule 
may have looked favorably upon Canadian law during this juncture, 
but Canadian courts grew uneasy with their complete lack of discre-
tion. 
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Canada introduced a new concept 
to Canadian law, "abuse ofprocess."170 The concept, with origins in civil 
law, referred to the inherent power of the court to control its own 
process. Under this doctrine, a court reserved the power to stay pro-
ceedings, effectively discontinuing the prosecution, if it felt that com-
pelling the accused to stand trial would violate those fundamental 
principles of justice that underlie the community's sense of fair play 
and decency. The Supreme Court indicated that this power was neces-
sary to prevent the abuse of the court's process through oppressive 
proceedings. 171 
The difficulty with the abuse of process doctrine was that it could 
only be employed to bring an entire prosecution to a halt. Some 
members of the Supreme Court, dissatisfied with the limited tools that 
the judiciary had at their disposal to ensure the integrity of the judicial 
process, desired a more precise remedial instrument. In Rothman v. 
The Queen,172 decided a year before the Charter was enacted, Justice 
Lamer had urged a reconsideration of the traditional Canadian ap-
proach. He asserted that a discretion should be recognized to exclude 
otherwise admissible confession evidence if, due to improper conduct 
by the authorities, its admission would "bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute."173 
169 LAw REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, THE EXCLUSION OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 
7 (1974). 
170 See R. v. Kirzner (1978) 2 S.C.R. 487. 
171 See Rourke v. The Queen (1978) 1 S.C.R. 1021, 1025-40 (Laskin, CJ., concurring). This 
newly recognized power was questioned, but it was quickly re-affirmed by the Court. See R. v. 
Krannenburg [1980)1 S.C.R.1053, 1061;R.v. Crneck, 17C.R. (3d) 171,179-83 (Ont. S.C. 1980). 
172 (1981) 1 S.C.R. 640, 677 (Lamer,]., concurring). 
17~ Id. at 696 (Lamer,]., concurring). The language used, "bringing the administration of justice 
into disrepute," was the language that had previously been advocated by the Law Reform Com-
mission of Canada in recommending the adoption of a discretionary exclusionary rule (discussed 
below). This term eventually was included in section 24(2) of the Charter, the provision that deals 
with the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence (discussed below). In RDthman, Lamer 
indicated that evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute if the conduct 
of the authorities would "shock the community." Id. at 697 (Lamer,]., concurring). But in the 
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Arguably, the development of the "abuse of process" doctrine, cou-
pled with the expressed desire of some judges to revise the traditional 
common law rule, reflected an increasing judicial frustration in Can-
ada. The Canadian judiciary was growing weary of being relegated to 
the sidelines in the important business of enforcing individual rights. 
The Court was uneasy with transferring to the Executive the unencum-
bered power to determine how rights would be respected and the 
role of the judiciary in this process. I74 This development is not dissimi-
lar to the American experience following WOif.I75 Mter Wolf, the United 
States Supreme Court was similarly dissatisfied with its role as mere 
spectator to the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment in the States. 
The Due Process Clause was then employed to exclude evidence if it 
had been obtained through conduct that shocked the conscience, 
offended a sense of justice or was at odds with the decencies of civilized 
conduct. 176 
Those who advocate the position that all evidence should be admit-
ted before the court, no matter how it has been obtained, propose that 
courts simply ignore official illegality. This, as we have seen, places 
courts in an uncomfortable position that they naturally resist. The 
United States Supreme Court, before deciding Mapp, responded to 
such a predicament with the Rnchin holding. Canadian courts reacted 
in a similar fashion, developing the "abuse of process" doctrine and 
Supreme Court's first decision under section 24(2) of the Oiarter, R. v. Therens, Justice LeDain 
specifically rejected the "shock the community" interpretation of the same terminology. See [1985] 
1 S.C.R. 613, 650-2 (LeDain, j., dissenting). He reasoned that some evidence that would bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute under section 24(2) might not necessarily shock the 
Canadian community and the court should not substitute for the words of section 24(2) another 
expression of the standard, drawn from a different jurisprudential context. The majority did not 
reach the issue. See iii. But this reasoning was adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court in its 
seminal decision on section 24(2). See Collins v. The Queen [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 286-87. In 
Collins, the Court emphasized a second distinction. In &thman there was merely police illegality. 
In contrast, under section 24(2), a violation of the Charter will have been established. The fact 
that the "most important law in the land" has been violated requires a lower threshold for 
evidentiary exclusion. See id. 
174The abuse of process doctrine had already been established in England. See Connelly v. 
Director of Public Prosecutions, [1964] App. Cas. 1254, 1354 (U.K.) (Lord Devlin had indicated, 
[A]re the courts to rely on the Executive to protect their process from abuse? Have they not 
themselves an inescapable duty to secure fair treatment for those who come or are brought before 
them? To questions of this sort there is only one possible answer. The courts cannot contemplate 
for a moment the transference to the Executive of the responsibility for seeing that the process 
oflaw is not abused.). 
175It should be recalled that Wolf made the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states, but 
did not extend the exclusionary rule along with it. See 367 U.S. 643. 
176 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952). 
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advocating a relaxation of the traditional common law rule. These 
developments are not anomalous; courts in other democratic nations 
like England, Scotland and Australia have responded in an analogous 
manner. 177 
In democratic nations, where a premium is placed on individual 
liberties, courts naturally resist efforts aimed at making them mere 
spectators in the important business of protecting individual rights. In 
such nations, when police illegality yields evidence of a crime, courts 
are inevitably called upon to impose a coercive sanction on the ag-
grieved defendant. To ask courts to employ their coercive powers 
against the defendant, without ever considering the process that 
brought him before the court, understandably prompts a judicial re-
sponse. The judiciary's desire to maintain the integrity of the courts, 
and appear removed from government illegality, was beginning to be 
felt in Canada prior to the Charter. 
During this period, some Canadian judges were openly expressing 
their disenchantment with the traditional common law approach. A 
respected Canadian jurist questioned whether rights, 
should be at the mercy of law enforcement officers and a 
blind eye turned to their invasion because it is more impor-
tant to secure a conviction. The contention that it is the duty 
of the Courts to get at the truth has in it too much of the 
philosophy of the end justitying the means. I78 
This dissatisfaction was not restricted to members of the judiciary. Even 
the Law Reform Commission of Canada advocated the adoption of a 
discretionary exclusionary rule. I79 In making this recommendation, the 
Commission discounted the importance of deterring police miscon-
duct, maintaining, instead, that such a rule was needed to protect the 
integrity of the judicial process. ISO 
177The English, Scottish and Australian experiences were discussed above. See supra notes 
22-63 and accompanying text. 
178R. v. Hogan [1975] 2 S.C.R. 547, 597 (Laskin,j., dissenting). 
179LAw REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, REpORT ON "EVIDENCE" 22 (1975) [hereinafter 
REpORT ON EVIDENCE]. The Commission recommended including a provision in the Evidence 
Act that required evidence to be excluded, "if it was obtained under such circumstances that its 
use in the proceedings would tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute." [d. A 
similar provision was recommended in the province of Ontario. See THE ONTARIO LAw REFORM 
COMMISSION, REpORT ON EVIDENCE 94 (1976). 
ISO See REpORT ON EVIDENCE, supra note 179, at 62. Six years later, in 1981, the Commission 
conducted an extensive study of search warrants and supporting affidavits issued in seven Cana-
dian cities. See LAw REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, POLICE-POWERS-SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN 
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It is difficult to understand these calls for reform if one subscribes 
to the view, advanced by some American commentators of the period, 
that alternative remedies had proven effective in Canada.181 In reality, 
the ineffectiveness of Canada's alternative remedies was fueling the 
demand for reform. Many were expressing doubts with regard to these 
remedies; "[t]hey are said to have their sanction in separate criminal 
or civil proceedings, of which there is little evidence, either as to 
recourse or effectiveness; or, perhaps, in internal police disciplinary 
proceedings against offending constables, a matter on which there is 
no reliable data in this country. "182 
In 1981, a Royal Commission (The McDonald Commission) inquir-
ed into the activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (R.C.M.P.), 
the country's national police force which had long been credited in 
Canada, and internationally, for its professionalism. The inquiry had 
come on the heels of a well-publicized scandal after it was discovered 
that members of the force had been responsible for a break-in at the 
offices of a "left wing" organization. The surreptitious search had 
occurred without a warrant. Mter hearing extensive testimony and 
reviewing internal R.C.M.P. files, the Commission concluded that with-
out judicial condemnation of unlawful police conduct, police officers 
believed that illegal practices were implicitly approved of by the judi-
ciary.183 For this reason, the Commission added its voice to the chorus 
of those calling for the adoption of a discretionary exclusionary rule. l84 
Canada's alternative remedies had failed to deter police illegality 
or appease the judiciary'S desire to play some role in safeguarding 
individual rights. Although aggrieved individuals could theoretically 
sue the police and the government, in the years prior to the Charter 
there are only two reported appellate cases in Canada involving such 
claims. l85 Those individuals most likely to be victims of police illegality, 
the young, the homeless, the poor, racial or ethnic minorities, and 
CRIMINAL LAw ENFORCEMENT 84, 297-98 (1981). A judicial panel reviewed the warrants and 
concluded that on average, 58.9% of warrants issued nationally were invalid. See id. The Com-
mission advocated that evidence obtained through illegal warrants should be excluded where its 
admission would tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. See id. 
181 See James E. Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem-Two Aptrroaches: The Canadian Turt 
Remedy and the U.S. Exclusionary Rule, 1]. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 36, 45-46 (1973); Shanks, supra 
note 13, at 665-66. 
18'lHogan [1975] 2 S.C.R at 595 (Laskin,]., dissenting) (Can.). 
183COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN 
MOUNTED POLICE, FREEDOM AND SECURITY UNDER LAw 1039-40 (1981). 
184 See id. at 1039-40. 
185 See Spiotto, supra note 181, at 45-49. 
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political dissidents, are also the least likely to pursue legal redress for 
police wrongs. At the same time, damage awards, in those rare in-
stances where an action was brought, were so trifling that there was 
little incentive to fund a civil action. In one of the two reported cases, 
for example, the successful plaintiff was awarded one dollar. ISS 
Prosecutions of the police for their illegal deeds were also infre-
quent, unless the illegality was so severe that it created a public outcry. 
This is understandable given that prosecutors work closely with the 
police on a daily basis. Prosecutors proved sympathetic to police 
officers who overstepped the boundaries, not for personal profit or 
gain, but in an effort to catch the "bad guys." In those rare cases when~ 
police officers were prosecuted, charges were usually laid that would 
minimize the impact on the individual officers involved. A good exam-
ple is provided by the R.C.M.P. scandal detailed above. 187 Instead of be-
ing prosecuted for the conventional criminal offense they were guilty 
of, breaking and entering, a more obscure charge was laid. The officers 
did not go to jail and their careers were not jeopardized. 
Although police complaint procedures existed in Canada, another 
Royal Commission concluded that there was a "tendency among po-
licemen to cover up each other's errors and to keep silent concern-
ing improper actions of brother officers. "188 Internal police discipline 
in Canada suffered from the typical problem associated with such 
measures everywhere: police officers investigating other officers are 
naturally sympathetic to their brethren, especially where the claimed 
misconduct relates to overstepping the permissible boundaries in pur-
suing "criminals." In Canada, like the United States, police have vigor-
ously opposed civilian-controlled police review boards. Such a body has 
been created in England, but it suffers from the same deficiency that 
has plagued an effective tort remedy. The vulnerable members of 
186 See id. at 45 n.46. 
187 See R. v. Coutellier, Cobb and Cormier (unreported decision) (Que. S.C. 1977). Instead of 
being prosecuted for breaking and entering, the officers were charged with willfully disobeying 
a federal statute (the Criminal Code). See id. The penalty for the latter offense allowed the judge 
to accede to the prosecutor's request that a "conditional discharge" be imposed. See id. The 
officers did not go to jail and the disposition, which is tantamount to a judicial pardon, allowed 
the officers to remain on the force. See id. For a discussion of the reluctance of Canadian 
authorities to prosecute police officers for illegal conduct in the course of investigating crime, 
see B.P. Archibald, The Law of Arrest in Canada, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN CANADA, STUDIES 
163-64 (Vincent DelBuono ed., 1982). 
IssTHE ROYAL COMMISSION INTO METROPOLITAN TORONTO POLICE PRACTICES 137 (1976). 
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society, who are most likely to be aggrieved by police misconduct, are 
the least likely to file complaints. 189 
An inquiry into the effectiveness of alternative remedies is only 
pertinent if one subscribes to the view that the sole purpose of eviden-
tiary exclusion is deterrence of police impropriety. This is why the 
deterrence of prospective police misconduct has figured so promi-
nently in the contemporary American debate, which is consumed with 
the issue of deterrence. But in Canada, as in England, Scotland and 
Australia, deterrence was not the driving force underlying the demand 
for reform. It was the integrity of the judiciary and the legal system, 
not deterrence, that lead Canada to reconsider its position on illegally 
obtained evidence. 
The catalyst for reform came during the 1981 debate surrounding 
the creation of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The move towards 
a constitutional instrument, defining the basic rights and freedoms of 
Canadians, was undoubtedly linked to the ineffectiveness of the statu-
tory bill of rights enacted in 1960. The 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights 
only applied to the Federal government, not the provinces, and it had 
been given little effect by the courts. 190 
The Charters Framers specifically chose to incorporate a number of 
provisions that would place limitations on the investigatory powers of 
the police and ensure fairness to the criminal defendant in the trial 
process. 191 However, the original drafts of the Canadian Charter did not 
contain provisions dealing with how the rights and freedoms guaran-
teed were to be enforced. Many were concerned that such an omission 
would render the Charter as ineffectual as the Canadian Bill of Rights. 
189 See Williams, supra note 5, at 328 (also noting that the system has additional flaws, including 
the fact that the complainant must initiate the procedure, involvement is costly in terms of time 
and days lost from work, and the complainant, who must identity himself, may fear reprisals). 
19°5ee HOGG, supra note 160, at 650. For a more detailed discussion of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights ineffectiveness, see Stanley Cohen, Criminal Procedure and The Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN CANADA, STUDIES 6-12 (Vincent M. DelBuono ed., 
1982). After the Charter was introduced, members of the Supreme Court of Canada even con-
ceded the poor experience under the Canadian Bill of Rights. In R v. Therens, Justice LeDain 
indicated that the Court cannot, 
avoid bearing in mind an evident fact of Canadian judicial history, which must be 
squarely and frankly faced: that on the whole, with some notable exceptions, the courts 
have felt some uncertainty and ambivalence in the application of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights because it did not reflect a clear constitutional mandate to make judicial decisions 
having the effect of limiting or qualifYing the traditional sovereignty of Parliament. 
[1985] 1 S.C.R. at 63S-39 (LeDain,J., dissenting). 
191 The Canadian Charter, supra note 1. 
118 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXII, No.1 
This led to demands that remedial provisions be included, as one 
commentator observed at the time: 
Declaring rights to exist does not stop a person from discrimi-
nating on the grounds of race or colour; declaring freedom 
from arbitrary arrest or search does not stop a person being 
arbitrarily arrested or searched; asserting a right to reason-
able bail does not stop a person being denied bail. The real 
problem in Canada is not the existence of generally accepted 
rights (even if they are difficult to formulate with precision) 
but the existence of adequate remedies for the violation of 
those rights. What should be examined is the entrenchment 
of their enforcement .... [I]f rights and freedoms are im-
portant enough to put in a constitution, then the enforce-
ment of those rights and freedoms are important enough to 
be included toO.192 
The Joint Subcommittee of Parliament and the Senate, which was 
charged with the responsibility of refining the provisions in the early 
drafts of the proposed Canadian Charter, eventually realized the "futil-
ity and possible confusion of enacting a constitution without entrench-
ed remedies. "193 
But the question arose as to what type of remedy should be available 
when the violation of an individual's constitutional rights has disclosed 
criminal evidence. In answering this question, Canada benefited not 
only from its own experience, and that of other Commonwealth coun-
tries, but most importantly from the American experience under the 
U.S. Bill of Rights. 
Silence in the Canadian Charter on the question of unconstitution-
ally-obtained evidence was not an option, because "in the absence of 
guidelines, one must foresee what some would consider the excesses of 
the American experience being imported into Canada. "194 Mter much 
debate, in which some had advocated a provision specifically prohibit-
ing the use of evidentiary exclusion, a compromise was reached. 195 The 
192Alan W. Mewett, Entrenching the Enforcement of Rights, 23 CRIM. L.Q. 129, 129-30 (1981). 
193MacDougalJ, supra note 21, at 616. 
194Mewett, supra note 192, at 130. 
195 See Paciocco, supra note 117, at 354; F.L. Morton et aI., The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms: A Descriptive Analysis of the First Decade, 1982-1992,5 NJ.C.L. 1, 31 (1994); Martin L. 
Friedland, Controlling the Administrators of Criminal Justice, 31 CRIM. L.Q. 280, 292 (1989). An 
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wording settled upon when the Charterwas entrenched in April 1982, 
is contained in section 24(2), which provides: 
Where ... a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a 
manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guar-
anteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is 
established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the 
admission of it in the proceedings would bring the admini-
stration of justice into disrepute.196 
The provision is dissimilar to the American exclusionary rule in two 
material respects. First, the expressed rationale for the rule is the 
integrity of the administration of justice, "deterrence remains buried 
under the surface. "197 Second, the provision is really not a "rule" at all. 
Instead, it confers a discretion on the court to exclude evidence on a 
very specific basis, namely, whether or not the admission of the evi-
dence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. l98 The 
provision, 
enshrines a· position with respect to evidence obtained in 
violation of Charter rights that falls between two extremes. 
Section 24(2) rejects the American rule that automatically ex-
cludes evidence obtained in violation of the Bill of Rights .... 
It also shuns the position at common law that all relevant 
evidence is admissible no matter how it was obtained.199 
early draft would have limited the potential remedies to a judicial declaration, an injunction or 
similar relief. See Constitution Amendment Bill, Bill C-60 (1978) § 24. 
196Early on in the development of jurisprudence under section 24(2), the Supreme Court 
pointed out that the French version of the text provided that the evidence should be excluded, 
ifits admission "couldbring the administration of justice into disrepute." See Collins v. The Queen 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 287-88 (emphasis added). The court chose the less onerous French text, 
over the English, as it better served to protect individual rights. See id. Therefore, the term 
"would" should be read as "could." See id. 
197Morissette, supra note 140, at 535. See also R. v. Hebert [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, 178 ("Section 
24(2) stipulates that evidence obtained in violation of rights may be excluded if it would tend to 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute, regardless of how probative it may be. No longer 
is reliability determinative. The Charter has made the rights of the individual and integrity of the 
judicial system paranlOunt."); R. v. Therens [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, 651-52 ("The central concern 
of s. 24(2) would appear to be the maintenance of respect for and confidence in the administra-
tion of justice, as that may be affected by the violation of constitutional rights and freedoms."); 
Friedland, supra note 195, at 295. But some lower courts have noted the punitive and deterrent 
benefits of evidentiary exclusion. See R. v. Woolley, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 531,545 (Ont.CAI988); R. v. 
Guiller, 25 C.R.R. 273, 304 (Ont.Dist.Ct.1985). 
198 See Thompson Newspapers Ltd. v. Dir. ofInvestigation and Research Combines Investigation 
Act [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, 483 (Wilson,J., dissenting). 
199R. v. Simmons [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495, 532. 
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In choosing to incorporate an exclusionary provision in its Consti-
tution, Canada recognized that proclaiming rights, in the absence of 
some remedy, transforms the "rights" into nothing more than "hollow 
promises. "200 This had been the effect of the 1960 Canadian Bill of 
Rights and it was this eventuality that was deemed unacceptable. It was 
increasingly being recognized that "[i]t is a deeply ingrained value in 
our democratic system that the ends do not justifY the means. In 
particular, evidence or convictions may, at times, be obtained at too 
high a price. "201 Asking courts to stand idly by, while the government 
encroaches upon individual freedoms, is inconsistent with the court's 
integral function in a modern democratic state. In modern democra-
cies, like Canada and the United States, central to the court's function, 
is the belief that the integrity of the court must be main-
tained. This is a basic principle upon which many other 
principles and rules depend. If the court is unable to preserve 
its own dignity by upholding values that ... society views as 
essential, ... [a state] will not long have a legal system which 
can pride itself on its commitment to justice and truth and 
which commands the respect of the community it serves.202 
Contemporary critics of the American exclusionary rule discount 
the importance of judicial integrity as a justification for the rule. But 
the experience in other nations, including England, Scotland, Austra-
lia and Canada, evidences why a discretion to exclude illegally-obtained 
evidence is fundamental to preserving judicial integrity in a modern 
democracy. At the same time, proponents of the American exclusion-
ary rule will undoubtedly be resistant to the creation of a discretionary 
rule. A discretionary rule, it is feared, will not be as effective in safe-
guarding individual constitutional rights. Canada's experience since 
the Charterwas introduced serves to undermine such arguments. 
V. BENEFITS OF A DISCRETIONARY EXCLUSIONARY "RULE": THE 
CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 
In the period prior to the Canadian Charter, some American com-
mentators had explained that civil actions in Canada were rare due to 
the "relative infrequency with which such [rights] violations occur in 
200 Brent, supra note 22, at 9. 
201 R. v. Mack [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903, 908. 
202 Id. 
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Canada. "203 However, one need only review the indexes of the criminal 
reports in the wake of the Charter to discover how common illegal 
police practices had been in Canada.204 Prior to the Charter, 
the frequency of illegality in police investigations never really 
came to the attention of the courts or of the public because 
Canadian courts, until 1982, did not exclude improperly ob-
tained evidence .... [T]he irregular methods must have ex-
isted on a similar and perhaps even greater scale before .... 
[I] n this regard, the Charter has been an eye-opener.205 
In the early years following the Charter's enactment, the parameters 
of the discretion conferred by section 24(2) remained largely un-
defined. Exactly when the "administration of justice could be brought 
into disrepute" by unconstitutionally obtained evidence was the subject 
of varied decisions by a number of Canadian appellate courts.206 
It was five years before the principles that would govern the opera-
tion of section 24(2) were firmly established by the Supreme Court of 
Canada. In Collins v. The QJi,een,207 the Court set forth needed guidance 
on the operation of this pivotal constitutional provision. Section 24(2) 
directs the court to have "regard to all the circumstances" in determin-
ing whether the admission of evidence could bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute. The Court organized the various circum-
stances to be considered into three general categories: those affecting 
the fairness of the trial; those related to the seriousness of the violation; 
and those relating to the effect of excluding the evidence on the 
reputation of the administration of justice.208 Each group of factors will 
203 Shanks, supra note 13, at 665. 
204 Since 1982, there have been thousands of cases decided in which Canadian courts concluded 
that the police acted unconstitutionally. See CANADA LAw BOOK, CANADIAN CRIMINAL CASES 
INDEX (Charter of Rights Annotations); CANADA LAw BOOK, WEEKLY CRIMINAL BULLETIN INDEX 
(Charter of Rights Annotations); CARSWELL, CRIMINAL REpORTS INDEX (Charter of Rights Anno-
tations); BUTTERWORTHS, CANADIAN RIGHTS REpORTER INDEX. 
205 Morissette, supra note 140, at 535. See also DAVID C. McDONALD, LEGAL RIGHTS IN THE 
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 229 (1989). 
206 See Michel Proulx, &defining The Balance of the Criminal Trial: The Effect of the Exclusionary 
Rule in Section 24(2) of the Charter, in CAMBRIDGE LECTURES 178, 181-89 (1985). 
207 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265. It is important to note that CoUins was actually the second case decided 
by the Supreme Court that dealt with the operation of section 24(2). However, the first case, 
Therens, was a relatively brief judgment. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613. In Therens, the Supreme Court 
excluded the results of a breath test because at the time of detention the defendant had not been 
informed of his right to retain and instruct counsel. The decision of the court was too ambiguous 
to provide firm guidance on the interpretation of section 24(2). See id. 
208 See CoUins [1987) 1 S.C.R. at 283-86; see also R. v.Jacoy [1988) 2 S.C.R. 548, 558-59. 
122 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXII, No. 1 
be considered individually, with reference in the footnotes to sub-
sequent significant decisions. 
A. Trial Fairness 
The first consideration, trial fairness, weighs heavily in the determi-
nation. If the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence affects 
trial fairness, then the evidence should be excluded. Unfair trials, 
according to the Court, will tend to bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute. A trial will be rendered unfair if the accused is con-
fronted with conscripted evidence, such as a statement, that would not 
have existed or could not have been discovered without a Charter 
violation.209 Such evidence should invariably be excluded because it 
"strikes at one of the fundamental tenets of a fair trial, the right against 
self-incrimination. "210 The seriousness of the charge will not affect this 
determination, as the more serious the offense, the more damaging to 
the system's repute would be an unfair trial.211 
In contrast, under the trial fairness consideration, the court distin-
guished the effect of admitting "real" evidence. Real evidence, like 
drugs, weapons or documents, generally pre-exists a Charter violation 
and is not brought into existence through a process of self-incrimina-
tion. The admission of such evidence will rarely affect the fairness of 
the trial.212 The nature of the evidence, however, is not necessarily 
209 See R. v. Mellenthin [1992) 3 S.C.R. 615, 62&-28. 
210 Collins [1987) 1 S.C.R. at 284. Under the U.S. Bill of Rights, there is no express provision 
that a detainee be informed of his right to retain counsel, but section lO(b) of the Charterprovides 
such a guarantee. See id. In the U.S., a defendant is entitled to be informed of his right to counsel 
because Miranda made this an adjunct entitlement under the Fifth Amendment. See Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.s. 436 (1966). But because the Fifth Amendment speaks to compulsion, the rule 
in Miranda was rationalized based on the "inherent coerciveness" of custodial interrogation. See 
ill. Strict exclusionary rules exist under Miranda where a defendant has not been appraised of 
his right to counsel and a statement is obtained. See id. The Supreme Court of Canada's emphasis 
on self-incrimination, as a factor weighing in favor of exclusion, is not dissimilar to the approach 
assumed under Miranda. It is consistent with a general trend in western nations to treat confes-
sion evidence with caution, especially where procedural safeguards, such as the right to speak 
with counsel, have not been respected. 
211 See Collins [1987) 1 S.C.R. at 286. If the admission of the evidence would compromise the 
fairness of the trial, the good faith of the police will have no effect on the decision to exclude 
the evidence. The reasoning underlying this position is that an unfair trial will always bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute, regardless of other considerations. See R. v. Bartle [1994) 
3 S.C.R. 173; R. v. Elshaw [1991) 3 S.C.R. 24; R. v. Broyles [1991) 3 S.C.R. 595, 619. But if there 
is ample independent evidence against the defendant, rendering the unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence relatively inconsequential, the fairness of the trial would not be compromised by the 
introduction of the evidence. See R. v. Smith [1991) 1 S.C.R. 714, 732. 
212 See Collins [1987) 1 S.C.R. at 284; see also R. v. Debot [1989) 2 S.C.R. 1140; R. v. Simmons 
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determinative of the trial fairness issue. The admission of unconstitu-
tionally obtained "real" evidence may occasionally affect the fairness 
of a trial if the defendant was conscripted against himself in the process 
oflocating it.m 
A final concern, which animates the trial fairness consideration, is 
whether the evidence at issue would have been obtained in anyevent.214 
Regardless of what form the evidence takes, if the prosecution can 
establish that despite the Charter violation the evidence would inevita-
bly have been discovered, then its admission will not impact adversely 
on the fairness of the trial. The admission of such evidence has no 
impact on trial fairness because it would have existed irrespective of 
the constitutional violation.215 
[1988] S.C.R 495; R v. Dairy Supplies Ltd. [1988] 1 S.C.R 665. However, evidence emanating 
from a defendant's person, such as breath, blood or urine, has been characterized as "con-
scripted." The reason for this classification is that such evidence cannot be obtained without a 
defendant's participation. Therefore, if internal bodily substances are obtained following a con-
stitutional violation, the evidence will invariably be excluded because its admission is said to 
compromise the fairness of the trial. SeeR v. Pozniak [1994] 3 S.C.R 310; R v. Harper [1994] 3 
S.C.R. 343; R v. Borden [1994] 3 S.C.R 145; R v. Prosper [1994] 3 S.C.R 236; Bartle [1994] 3 
S.C.R. at 173; R v. Dyment [1988] 2 S.C.R 417; R v. Pohoretsky [1987] 1 S.C.R 945. On the 
basis of similar reasoning, identification evidence resulting from a "line-up" is considered 'con-
scripted." See R v. Ross [1989] 1 S.C.R 3. Such evidence could not be obtained without the 
defendant's participation in creating it. See ill. 
2130ne example might be a case in which a defendant's right to counsel is violated, he 
confesses, and then leads the police to incriminating physical evidence. In such circumstances, 
the fact that the physical evidence is "real" is immaterial; the court will focus on the self-incrimi-
natory process that resulted in the evidence being located. See R v. Burlingham [1995] 2 S.C.R. 
206; Mellenthin [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 628-29; Ross [1989] S.C.R at 16-17. Some Canadian commen-
tators have criticized the distinction between "real" and "conscripted" evidence. See RJ. Delisle, 
Collins: An Unjustified Distinctiun, 56 C.R (3d) 216, 218 (1987); Bruce P. Elman, Collins v. The 
Queen, Further Jurisprudence un Sectiun 24(2) of the Charter, 25 ALTA. L. REv. 477 (1987); Steven 
M. Penney, Unreal Distinctiuns: The Exclusion of Unfairly Obtained Evidence Under S. 24(2) of the 
Charter, 32 ALTA. L. REv. 782 (1994). 
214 See Collins [1987] 1 S.C.R at 284-85. 
215Take the example of a defendant whose right to counsel is violated. Imagine that after the 
Charterviolation, the defendant confesses and leads the police to incriminating physical evidence. 
If the prosecution is able to establish that the physical evidence would have been inevitably 
discovered, its admission would not impact adversely on the fairness of the trial. Such evidence 
would have existed irrespective of the Charter violation. In contrast, if the prosecution cannot 
make such a showing, the admission of the evidence would impact adversely on trial fairness 
because the defendant has been "conscripted" against himself in the process of locating the 
evidence. See Burlingham [1995] 2 S.C.R 206; R v. S. (RJ.) [1995] 1 S.C.R 451. It is only lawful 
investigative techniques that can be considered as alternative sources of discovery. See R v. Dersch 
[1993] 3 S.C.R 768. The burden of establishing that evidence would have been inevitably 
discovered rests squarely on the prosecution. In the case of confessions obtained after the 
defendant's right to counsel was violated, the prosecution must establish that a confession would 
have been made without the Charter violation. See Harper [1994] 3 S.C.R 343; Bartle [1994] 3 
S.C.R.173. 
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B. Seriousness of the Charter Violation 
If the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence would not 
affect the fairness of the defendant's trial, the court must next consider 
the seriousness of the Charter violation.216 In assessing the seriousness 
of the violation, the principal concern is the conduct of the authori-
ties.217 Evidentiary exclusion, however, is not to be used to "discipline 
the police"218 or as a "remedy for police misconduct. ''219 A serious 
violation weighs in favor of exclusion because it is necessary to prevent 
having the administration of justice brought into further disrepute by 
judicial condonation of unacceptable conduct by the investigatory and 
prosecutorial agencies.220 
In assessing the seriousness of a Charter violation, a judge must 
consider whether the violation occurred "in good faith, or was inad-
vertent or of a merely technical nature, or whether it was deliberate, 
willful or flagrant ... [or] whether the action was motivated by urgency 
or necessity to prevent the loss or destruction of evidence. "221 Given 
216 The Court has concluded that even if a Charter violation is not "serious," if the admission 
of the evidence would render the defendant's trial unfair it should be excluded. SeeElshaw [1991] 
3 S.C.R at 45; Broyles [1991] 3 S.C.R at 619; Mellenthin [1992] 3 S.C.R at 629-30; Hebert [1990] 
2 S.C.R at 207 (Sopinka, j., concurring). The good faith or inadvertence of the police cannot 
cure either an unfair trial for the defendant or the impact that such a trial would have on the 
repute of the judicial system. See Elshaw [1991] 3 S.C.R at 45; Broyles [1991] 3 S.C.R at 619; 
Mellenthin [1992] 3 S.C.R. at 629-30; Hebert [1990] 2 S.C.R at 207 (Sopinka,j., concurring). 
217 See Collins [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 285. It is the conduct of the authorities, throughout the entire 
investigation, which is pertinent. See R. v. Strachan [1988] 2 S.C.R 980, 1007. 
218 Collins [1987] 1 S.C.R at 275. 
219Id. at 281. 
220 See ill. at 280-81. In Collins, the Court concluded that the drugs discovered through an 
unconstitutional search should be excluded, emphasizing the "flagrant and serious" Charter 
violation and the need to disassociate itself from the conduct of the police. See id. at 288-89. 
221Id. at 285 (quoting with approval LeDain's statement in Therens [1985] 1 S.C.R at 652 
(LeDain, j., dissenting)). The Court has subsequently held that all mitigating and aggravating 
factors must be considered. SeeElshaw [1991] 3 S.C.R. at 39-40; Strachan [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 1006. 
In addition, the Court has since indicated that "good faith" can only be relied upon where the 
police acted under express statutory authority and were unaware of the statute's constitutional 
invalidity or were following an accepted investigative procedure later declared unconstitutional. 
SeeR v. Genereux [1992] 1 S.C.R 259; R v. Wong [1990] 3 S.C.R 36; R v. Thomspon [1990] 2 
S.C.R 1111; R. v. Greffe [1990]1 S.C.R 755; R v. Duarte [1990]1 S.C.R 30; R v. Hamill [1987] 
1 S.C.R 301; R v. Simmons [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495; Casey Hill, The Role of Fault in Section 24(2) of 
the Charter, in THE CHARTER'S IMPACT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 56 Uamie Cameron 
ed., 1996). In order to make out a claim of urgency or necessity, the Court has held that the 
police cannot rely on evidence discovered after the unconstitutional behavior. See Greffe [1990] 
1 S.C.R at 796; R v. Genest [1989] 1 S.C.R 59, 70; Hamill [1987] 1 S.C.R at 308. Rather, it is 
the circumstances known to the police at the time that are pertinent. See Griffo [1990] 1 S.C.R. 
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the emphasis on the conduct of the authorities, the fact that other 
lawful investigatory techniques would have led to the same evidence 
tends to render the violation more serious. The failure to proceed 
constitutionally, when the option to do so was available, evidences a 
blatant disregard for the Charter and weighs in favor of exclusion.222 
C. Effect of Excluding the Evidence 
The final group of relevant factors, articulated by the Court, relate 
to the effect of excluding the evidence. It is against these considera-
tions that the seriousness of the Charter-violation must be weighed. The 
ultimate question to be determined "is whether the system's repute will 
be better served by the admission or the exclusion of the evidence. "223 
The potential effect of either option must be considered because it 
would be inconsistent with section 24(2) to exclude evidence if the 
exclusion would bring the administration of justice into greater disre-
pute than its admission.224 
In evaluating the effect of admission or exclusion on the repute of 
the justice system, a court should not focus exclusively on the individ-
ual case presented. Rather, it is the long-term consequences of regular 
admission or exclusion in analogous circumstances that must be con-
sidered.225 Although the concept of "repute" is related to community 
perceptions, admissibility is not determined by reference to majority 
views. Given the Charter's purpose in protecting the individual defen-
dant from the majority, it would be unwise to allow majoritarian views 
on the subject to predominate.226 Instead, the relevant question is: 
at 796; R. v. Genest [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59, 70; HamiU [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 308. Further, the necessity 
or urgency does not give rise to a blanket exception to Charter rights; the authorities must still 
endeavor to keep the unconstitutional behavior to that which is minimally required to deal with 
the necessity or urgency of the circumstances. See R. v. Babinski [1992] 3 S.C.R. 467; GreJfo [1990] 
1 S.C.R. at 796. Although a violation will be tolerated due to urgency or necessity, once the 
situation giving rise to such a claim has ended, the charter must be complied with. See Strachan, 
[1988] 2 S.C.R. at 1007-08. The police cannot use an earlier crisis to rationalize an ongoing 
violation of constitutional rights once the crisis has dissipated. See Uf. 
222 See CoUins [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 285. This approach is stricter than that taken in the United 
States, where regardless of how egregious the conduct of the authorities, if evidence would 
inevitably have been discovered it is admissible. In Canada, the converse position has been 
specifically rejected by the Supreme Court. The fact that police do not have any alternative lawful 
investigative means to employ does not mitigate the seriousness of the violation. In such circum-
stances, the police must leave the individual alone. See R. v. Kokesch [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3, 29. 
223 CoUins [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 285. 
224 See id. 280-81. 
225 See id. 
225 See id. 
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'Would the admission of the evidence bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute in the eyes of the reasonable man, dispassionate 
and fully apprised of the circumstances? The reasonable person is 
usually the average person in the community, but only when that 
community'S current mood is reasonable."227 
According to the Court, the administration of justice would be 
brought into disrepute if evidence essential to secure a conviction were 
excluded because of a "trivial" breach of the Charter. The more serious 
the offense involved, the greater danger for judicial disrepute.228 On 
the other hand, if admitting the evidence would result in an unfair 
trial, the serious nature of the offense charged could not render the 
evidence admissible. The more serious the offense, the more damaging 
an unfair trial would be to the repute of the judicial system. 229 
The decision in CoUins v. The QJteen, whether one agrees with the 
Court or not, undoubtedly served to establish clear guidelines in the 
exercise of the discretion conferred by section 24(2). The discretion 
vested in judges, faced with unconstitutionally obtained evidence, can-
not be wielded arbitrarily. Lower courts must explain their decision to 
exclude or admit evidence, within the framework articulated by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. This permits appellate courts to review the 
reasoning of trial judges and to ensure consistency of application in 
the use of section 24(2). Unlike the limited common law discretion 
that predated the Canadian Charter, or the standard for due process 
WId. at 282. It is important to note that common law courts have historically been called upon 
to apply a "reasonable person" test in a variety of circumstances. Most notably, judges have long 
been expected to apply this common standard in tort cases. The concept is not new to Canadian 
law. 
228 See id. at 285-86. 
229 See CoUins [1987]1 S.C.R. at 285-86. The Court has consistently refrained from considering 
the harmful effects of exclusion once it is determined that admitting the unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence would lead to an unfair trial. See R. v. Evans [1991] 1 S.C.R 869, 898-99; R. v. 
Black [1989] S.C.R. 138, 160; R. v. Ross [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3, 16. In such circumstances, an unfair 
trial would lead to disrepute, and more so as the seriousness of the offense increases. See R. v. 
Evans [1991] 1 S.C.R 869,898-99; R. v. Black [1989] S.C.R. 138, 160; R. v. Ross [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
3, 16. The Court has taken this approach even where the serious charge is one of murder. See 
Burlingham [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206; Broyles [1991] 3 S.C.R. 595; R. v. Bridges [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190; 
R. v. Clarkson [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383. Some Canadian commentators have criticized this emphasis 
on "trial fairness," claiming that such an approach fails to give adequate consideration to the 
effect of exclusion, the final factor articulated in CoUins. See Paciocco, supra note 117, at 353; 
Robert Harvie & Hamar Foster, Different Drummers, Different Drums: The Supreme Court of 
Canada, American Jurisprudence and the Continuing Revision of Criminal Law Under the Charler, 
24 OTTAWA L. REv. 39, 46 (1992); RJ. Delisle, Mellenthin: Changing the CoUins Test, 16 C.R. (4th) 
286, 290 (1993). 
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review in the United States after Rochin, clear criteria exist in Canada 
to guide courts in the use of their discretion to exclude unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence. 
A discretionary exclusionary rule, that is not coupled with clear 
criteria, creates a danger that courts will be reluctant to use their 
exclusionary power.230 The experience in Canada following Collins v. 
The QJ.teen demonstrates the benefits of articulating specific criteria to 
guide courts in the exercise of their discretion. Canadian courts have 
consistently resorted to section 24(2) to exclude unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence when an application of the Collins' criteria has lead 
to a conclusion that admission could bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute. In the Charter's first ten years, the Supreme Court of 
Canada was presented with forty cases in which evidence had been 
obtained unconstitutionally. In nineteen of the cases, the Supreme 
Court excluded the evidence, in twenty cases the evidence was admit-
ted, and in one case some evidence was excluded, while some admit-
ted.2!l1 A similar trend can be seen in lower courts, which have consis-
tently exercised their discretion in favor of excluding evidence.232 
VI. APPLICATION OF THE CANADIAN DISCRETIONARY RULE OF 
EXCLUSION TO THE AMERICAN EXCLUSIONARY RULE DEBATE 
An examination of the Canadian experience reveals a number of 
benefits associated with a discretionary rule of exclusion, when such a 
rule is coupled with clear criteria to control its application. The imme-
diate benefit of a discretionary rule of exclusion is that it avoids the 
perceived unfairness that has given rise to much of the criticism of the 
American exclusionary rule. 
250This occurred in England following the Privy Council decision in Kuruma [1955] App. Cas. 
197, and in Canada following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Wray [1970] S.C.R. 272. See 
also Pattenden, sufrra note 50, at 677 (arguing that it is not enough to recognize a discretion, it 
must be coupled with "fairly specific guidelines"). 
231 See GERARD E. MITCHELL, THE SUPREME COURT ON EXCLUDING EVIDENCE UNDER THE 
CHARTER, app. B (1992); Morton et al., supra note 195, at 32. 
232 Paul Denis Godin, A Comparative Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Standing Threshold 
in Canada, the United States, and New Yom State: The Relation of Purpose to Practice, 53 U. TORONTO 
FAC. L. REv. 49, 7I (1995). The author conducts a random survey of reported Canadian cases. 
The conclusion from this random survey is that in 38% of the cases unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence was excluded. No comprehensive study of all Canadian decisions on exclusion or 
admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence has been conducted, but it is fair to say that 
exclusion is not infrequent. 
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In the United States, the gradual evisceration of the exclusionary 
rule, through the deterrence rationale and the cost-benefit analysis, is 
fueled by the judiciary's perception that the rule leads to unfairness. 
Justice Cardozo's criticism that the rule is illogical because it lets the 
"criminal go free because the constable has blundered"233 undeniably 
bottoms most attacks on the exclusionary rule. The perceived unfair-
ness is not alleviated by the response that it is the Constitution and not 
the rule that sets the criminal free. The fact of the matter remains that 
the exclusionary rule flaunts before us the cost of constitutional safe-
guards. 
Proponents of an exclusionary rule must concede that the costs of 
such a rule occasionally seem too harsh. If a defendant charged with 
murder is released because a relatively minor and unintended violation 
of his rights disclosed essential evidence, then it is difficult to deny that 
the rule occasionally exacts too high a price. The problem with the 
American exclusionary rule is that it is unable to effectively cope with 
such exceptional cases. Generally, the rule demands that evidence be 
excluded regardless of society's competing interest in not having a 
dangerous criminal released back into the community. American pro-
ponents of the exclusionary rule argue that the cost in such cases is 
necessary to safeguard the Constitution's guarantees against govern-
mental encroachment. But the Canadian experience under the Charter 
betrays the flaw in such reasoning. 
Unlike the United States, Canadian courts are directed to consider 
the seriousness of the constitutional violation and balance this concern 
against the effect of excluding the evidence. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has recognized that the administration of justice would be 
brought into disrepute if evidence essential to secure a conviction were 
excluded because of a "trivial" breach of the Charter, especially in 
serious cases. 2M This position takes into account two factors ignored by 
the American approach. First, all constitutional violations are not the 
same, some are more serious while others can be fairly described as 
technical in nature.235 Second, contemporary discontent with the 
253 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). 
234 See CoUins [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 285-86. This fact was also noted by the Australian High Court. 
See Bunning v. Cross 19 A.L.R. 641 (H.C. 1978). 
2S5This point is demonstrated by the nature of Fourth Amendment litigation in the United 
States. Frequently, the motion judge will rule one way on the requirements of the Constitution 
in a given case. An appellate court may overturn this holding. Finally, the Supreme Court may 
overturn the appellate court but take a position that differs from the original judge's interpreta-
tion of the Constitution. In light of this, it would be naive to suggest that what the Constitution 
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courts and the Constitution is fueled by a public perception that 
criminals are permitted to go free due to "technicalities." Although 
exclusion in such cases may be deemed necessary in the United States 
to maintain the deterrent benefits of the exclusionary rule, this rea-
soning ignores the competing justifications for the exclusionary rule. 
In examining the experience of England, Scotland, Australia and 
Canada, it is clear that deterrence is but one competing justification 
for an exclusionary rule. The integrity of the judicial system has figured 
prominently in the creation of an exclusionary rule in both Australia 
and Canada. This rationale was even relied upon in early American 
jurisprudence. The American rule, at present, ignores the fact that 
excluding evidence for technical constitutional violations undermines 
the integrity of the judicial system when the offense charged is serious. 
In contrast, a discretionary rule, like that used in Canada, permits a 
court to acknowledge and minimize the deleterious effect on judicial 
integrity occasioned by evidentiary exclusion in some cases. 
American courts, in their effort to limit the application of the exclu-
sionary rule, have focused on deterrence as the rule's sole justification. 
The emphasis on deterrence, however, has posed an impediment to 
alleviating the most troublesome aspect of the rule's operation. If 
deterrence is the exclusionary rule's only purpose, then dangerous 
criminals must go free, even if a constitutional violation was relatively 
minor or technical. This reasoning ignores the harmful effect that 
exclusion may occasionally have on the integrity of the courts. In a free 
society it is essential that the court command respect within the com-
munity, otherwise it will not be long before the authority of the court 
is diminished and the rule of law is threatened. Should this occur, the 
collective freedom of everyone within a society would be markedly 
diminished. 
A discretionary exclusionary rule holds other benefits, in addition 
to addressing the perceived unfairness of an automatic rule. In Can-
ada, the decision whether to exclude or admit unconstitutionally ob-
tained evidence depends on an evaluation of all the circumstances of 
a particular case. In contrast, in the United States, the "rule" operates 
automatically subject to an ever increasing list of blanket exceptions.236 
The difficulty with the contemporary American position is the judici-
ary's effort to scale back the rule's operation through the use of 
requires is always clear, or that every violation is serious and none are in fact technical or trivial. 
See BRADLEY, supra note 21, at 49-51, 55. 
236 See supra note III and accompanying text. 
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exceptions. "There are so many exceptions to the rule of exclusion 
that it is becoming difficult to continue characterizing it as a 'rule."'237 
The sentencing exception, set out in Tejada, is illustrative of the poten-
tial problems with this approach. 
In Tejada, the Court held that unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
was admissible at a sentencing hearing because deterrence was not be 
served by excluding the evidence. This exception operates no matter 
how egregious the conduct of the authorities in securing the evidence. 
More importantly the exception operates even if the very purpose of 
the authorities, now aware of the exception, was to secure evidence by 
unconstitutional means for the sole purpose of using it to obtain a 
harsher sentence.238 
The rigidity of the American exclusionary rule, with its exclusive 
emphasis on deterrence, has spawned numerous inflexible exceptions, 
resulting in an inconsistent application of the Constitution's safe-
guards. Some defendants derive a great benefit from the rule's appli-
cation, especially where the constitutional violation seems minor and 
the evidence excluded is significant to the government's case. In con-
trast, other defendants whose constitutional rights are violated are left 
with no remedy at all. This absolute approach to the exclusion of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence may have the benefit of predict-
ability and certainty, however: 
"Certainty can be bought at too high a price." It is only by 
vesting trial judges with a discretion as to whether to admit 
or exclude improperly obtained evidence that it will be pos-
sible for all the relevant considerations ... to be taken into 
account in individual cases .... "Rules without discretion can-
not fully take into account the need for tailoring results to 
unique facts and circumstances of particular cases. The 
justification for discretion is often the need for individualized 
justice. "239 
237 Brent, supra note 22, at 25. 
238 See United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1261-62 (2d Cir. 1992). The court discounted 
this potential danger as unrealistic in deciding that the exclusionary rule should not operate in 
a sentencing hearing. A similar problem plagues all of the "exceptions" to the U.S. exclusionary 
rule. The difficulty with such exceptions is that once they are entrenched, American courts are 
powerless to provide redress for unconstitutional conduct aimed exclusively at securing the 
benefits of one of the myriad of exceptions. 
239 Andrew L.T. Choo, Improperly Obtained Evidence: A Reconsideration, 9 LEGAL STUD. J. 261, 
282 (1989). 
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In clinging to an automatic exclusionary rule while claiming that the 
only justification for the rule is deterrence, American courts have 
begun to limit the applicability of the exclusionary rule to a whole host 
of circumstances. In areas subject to such exceptions the Constitution 
has been rendered meaningless for all practical purposes. This effort 
to ameliorate the perceived harshness of the exclusionary rule has left 
many governmental activities immune from constitutional scrutiny. In 
contrast, a discretionary approach, like that used in Canada, would 
permit a trial judge to fashion a remedy appropriate to the circum-
stances without abandoning the prospect of scrutinizing governmental 
activity in analogous circumstances in future. 
The American judiciary'S dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule 
creates a further difficulty that does not arise when a discretionary rule 
of exclusion is used. American judges recognize that a finding that 
police have acted unconstitutionally will necessitate that any evidence 
obtained must be excluded from the trial. If a perception exists that 
such a result would be "unfair" in a given case, there is a danger that 
the judge may bend findings of fact to avoid a conclusion that the 
Constitution has been violated.240 Similarly, even if findings of fact are 
not manipulated, there is a real danger that judges may simply misap-
ply the Constitution to avoid an undesired result. A 1986 study of 
Fourth Amendment cases decided in nine States reveals that 15.7% of 
the cases studied resulted in convictions being reversed because lower 
courts had applied the Fourth Amendment incorrectly. In addition, 
the same study concluded that another 10.3% of cases should have 
been reversed but were not because the appellate court also misapplied 
the Fourth Amendment. In total, 26% of the cases studied involved 
courts misconstruing the Constitution to the detriment of the defen-
dants.241 This does not evidence that courts are disingenuous in apply-
ing the Constitution 26% of the time, but undoubtedly many of these 
decisions were the product of individual judges attempting to avoid 
the harsh consequences of an automatic exclusionary rule. 
Under a discretionary approach to the exclusion of unconstitution-
ally obtained evidence, the question of exclusion is both theoretically 
and practically separated from a determination of whether a defen-
dant's rights were violated.242 A Canadian trial judge may freely con-
240 See Kamisar, supra 124, at 18; Choo, supra note 239, at 280. 
241 See Craig M. Bradley, Are State Courts Enfurcing the Fourth Amendment? A Preliminary Study, 
77 GEO. LJ. 251, 283 n.182 (1988). 
242 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983). The Supreme Court held that whether the 
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clude that a defendant's rights were violated, without such a conclusion 
necessarily leading to the exclusion of evidence. The benefit of such 
an approach is that the police officer involved always learns of his 
unconstitutional conduct and in future will be able to act in accord-
ance with the Constitution. In contrast, in the study outlined above, 
police officers remained ignorant of their unconstitutional behavior in 
26% of the cases studied. 243 
There is one final benefit to a discretionary approach to unconsti-
tutionally-obtained evidence. Given that Mapp was decided in 1961, 
many of the courts' constitutional decisions in the area of criminal 
procedure occurred under the specter of an automatic exclusionary 
rule. It is impossible to accurately predict how the Constitution's safe-
guards would have been interpreted in the United States under a 
discretionary exclusionary rule. The Canadian experience, however, 
provides some general insight into this question. Comparison between 
section 8 of the Charter and the Fourth Amendment seems particularly 
appropriate, as the respective constitutional provisions are practically 
iden tical,244 
Some commentators have observed that since Mapp was decided, 
the United States Supreme Court has taken a persistently narrow 
approach in interpreting the Fourth Amendment. 245 It is claimed that 
exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case is an issue separate from the 
question of whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were 
violated by police conduct. See id. Despite this theoretical separation of the two issues, it is difficult 
to deny that in most cases a finding that evidence was obtained unconstitutionally will lead to 
automatic exclusion, unless one of the recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule is applica-
ble. 
243 Assuming, of course, that the officers in the 15.7% cases overturned on appeal did not learn 
of the appellate court's decision. 
244 The Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. N. Section 8 of the Canadian Charter provides: "Everyone has the right to 
be secure against unreasonable search or seizure." Canadian Charter, supra note 1 § 8. 
In Hunter v. Southam Inc., the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that a valid warrant is a 
pre-condition for a reasonable search or seizure, where it is feasible to obtain one. [1984] 2 S.C.R 
145. As a result, section 8 parallels the Fourth Amendment. In fact, in Hunter the Court held 
that the purpose underlying section 8 was the protection of an individual's reasonable expectation 
of privacy. This is the very same purpose that the United States Supreme Court has held to 
underlie the Fourth Amendment. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
245 See Katz, supra note 9, at 117. 
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this effort to relax the restrictions upon police behavior has been 
motivated by a desire "to round the sharp edges of the exclusionary 
rule. "246 Others have offered a harsher explanation, attributing these 
developments to the "prostituting effect of the exclusionary rule."247 A 
brief comparison between American decisions under the Fourth 
Amendment and Canadian decisions under section 8 of the Charter 
reveals that these criticisms are not unfounded. The Supreme Court 
of Canada has consistently taken a more expansive view than the 
United States Supreme Court on the type of police behavior that 
constitutes an intrusion upon reasonable expectations of privacy war-
ranting constitutional protection.248 
In the United States, the Fourth Amendment has been held inappli-
cable where the authorities enter private property and search an area 
beyond the curtilage of a home. There is no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in "open fields" according to the United States Supreme 
Court.249 But the Supreme Court of Canada has drawn no distinction 
between curtilage and open fields and consistently characterized any 
entry upon the property surrounding a residence to be a "search" 
meriting section 8 scrutiny. 250 
In Canada, the privacy expectations in the home are so great that 
they include a reasonable expectation of privacy in the approach to a 
246 [d. 
247 Caldwell & Chase, supra note 14, at 53. 
248 See Jerome Atrens, A Comparison of Canadian and American Constitutional Law Relating to 
Search and Seizure, 1 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 29, 34 (1994). The Supreme Court of Canada has not 
simply taken a more progressive approach than the United States Supreme Court in the area of 
search and seizure. On a more general level, American and Canadian academics conducted an 
extensive review of constitutional jurisprudence in both countries and concluded that "the 
Supreme Court of Canada now protects the interests of the accused more vigorously than its 
American counterpart." Robert Harvie & Hamar Foster, Ties that Bind? The Supreme Court of 
Canada, American Jurisprudence, and the Revision of Canadian Criminal Law Under the Charter, 
28 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 729, 734-35 (1990). However, in arriving at this conclusion, the authors 
refrained from addressing the differing approaches of both nations to the exclusion of uncon-
stitutionally obtained evidence, noting that "a satisfactory comparative treatment of the two 
countries' exclusionary rules would require an article in itself." [d. at 735. However, the discussion 
that follows focuses exclusively on the area of search and seizure. A more expansive comparison 
of substantive rights is not engaged in for two reasons: first, as noted earlier, the exclusionary 
rule debate in the United States has been focused almost entirely on the exclusionary remedy 
developed under the Fourth Amendment; second, a comparison of this nature is deserving of 
distinct treatment, which has been effectively undertaken by others. For a more recent compari-
son by the same commentators, see Harvie & Foster, supra note 229. 
249 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
250 See R. v. Plant [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281; R. v. Wiley [1993] 3 S.C.R. 263; R. v. Kokesch [1990] 3 
S.C.R.3. 
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home. The implied invitation to the public to approach and knock 
extends no further than is required to permit convenient communica-
tion with the occupant of the home, and only those activities that are 
reasonably associated with this purpose are authorized by the implied 
license. A police offi<:;,er who approaches a dwelling for the purpose of 
securing evidence against the occupant exceeds the implied invitation 
and conducts a "search" of the home which must comport with section 
8 standards.251 
The disparity in the Canadian and American approaches becomes 
even more apparent when governmental intrusions involving techno-
logical advances are considered. The Supreme Court of Canada has 
recognized that "methods of electronic surveillance have the potential, 
if uncontrolled, to annihilate privacy. "252 
In the United States, a government agent is free to surreptitiously 
record a conversation with an individual. The Fourth Amendment 
does not apply because everyone assumes the risk that a conversation 
could be repeated accurately in court, whether through memory or 
mechanical recording.253 The Supreme Court of Canada, however, has 
distinguished between the risk posed by speaking to an informant and 
the prospect that government agents may be listening to and recording 
our conversations every time we speak. 
They involve different risks to the individual and the body 
politic. In other words, the law recognizes that we inherently 
have to bear the risk of the "tattle-tale" but draws the line at 
concluding that we must also bear, as the price of choosing 
to speak to another human being, the risk of a having a 
permanent recording made of our words.254 
The same reasoning has been applied to video surveillance. In Can-
ada, an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not waived the 
moment they invite an individual into a private place like a hotel room. 
According to the Supreme Court, 
251 See R. v. Evans [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, 18. But contrast this position with State v. Petty, where the 
Court held that no reasonable expectation of privacy was intruded upon when police approached 
a residence, knocked on the door, and sniffed for odor of marijuana when the resident opened 
the door. 740 P.2d 879 (Wash. App. 1987). 
252R. v. Wong [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, 47. 
253 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
254R. v. Duarte [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, 48. The Court preferred the approach of American state 
courts, interpreting privacy guarantees under their state constitutions, over the approach of the 
United States Supreme Court in White. See id. 
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there is an important difference between the risk that our 
activities may be observed by other persons, and the risk that 
agents of the state, in the absence of prior authorization, will 
permanently record those activities on video tape .... To fail 
to recognize the distinction is to blind oneself to the fact that 
the threat to privacy inherent in subjecting ourselves to the 
ordinary observations of others pales by comparison with the 
threat to privacy posed by allowing the state to make perma-
nent electronic records of our words or activities. 255 
135 
In contrast, such measures would appear acceptable in the United 
States under the "risk analysis." If one assumes the risk by exposing a 
private place to public view, then reasonable expectations of privacy 
are lost; government deception is irrelevant to the constitutional equa-
tion.256 
In the United States, police are free to affix an electronic transmit-
ting device to a vehicle in order to monitor an individual's where-
abouts. The Fourth Amendment is inapplicable, as the police could 
theoretically monitor the vehicle without such a device, therefore no 
reasonable expectation of privacy is encroached upon. 257 But when 
confronted with the same issue, the Supreme Court of Canada again 
rejected the all or nothing approach to privacy expectations that 
plagues Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court conceded that 
police could theoretically monitor a citizen's movements while in their 
vehicle through ordinary surveillance and the use of sensory enhanc-
ing devices like binoculars. The Supreme Court of Canada, however, 
recognized a profound difference between "the threat to privacy in-
herent in courting the ordinary observations of other members of 
society ... [and] the threat to privacy posed by allowing the state to 
electronically monitor our every movement. "258 State activity in the 
latter category intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
is subject to scrutiny under section 8 of the Charter. 
While taking a more expansive view of the meaning of "search," the 
Supreme Court of Canada has also asserted a higher standard for 
255 Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 48. 
256 See HofIa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (use of secret informers, acting at the behest 
of government, does not intrude on reasonable privacy expectations); Lewis v. United States, 385 
U.S. 206 (1966) (permissible for government agents to misrepresent their identity or purpose in 
order to obtain access to private places). 
257 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
258 R. v. Wise [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 564, (LaForest, j., dissenting in the result only). 
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waiver of this right. If an individual consents to be searched, in either 
Canada or the United States, constitutional scrutiny is no longer nec-
essary. A valid consent essentially removes the search from the ambit 
of the Constitution. In the United States, a consent to search is valid 
if it is voluntarily given.259 Voluntariness simply means free from duress 
or coercion. The authorities have no obligation to inform an individual 
of his or her right to refuse consent. In Canada, a valid consent to 
search requires more. The individual giving consent must be possessed 
of the requisite informational foundation for a true relinquishment of 
the right. He or she must know of the right to refuse consent, before 
the "consent" will be considered valid.260 
This brief comparison reveals a significant benefit that flows from a 
discretionary exclusionary rule. If courts are not preoccupied with the 
consequences that flow from constitutional violations, they are more 
inclined to assume a more generous interpretation of the Constitu-
tion's guarantees. In the United States, both trial and appellate courts 
must be cognizant of the effect of their decisions on the case immedi-
ately before them. A court's decision will frequently lead to the defen-
dant's being released. This may seem somewhat unfair if the police 
endeavored to act constitutionally, but were simply unaware of the 
correct procedure because the law in the area was previously unsettled. 
Similarly, appellate courts must also be aware of the effect that their 
decisions will have on future cases. For instance, a holding by the 
Supreme Court that an individual must be informed of his right to 
refuse consent to a search would require automatic exclusion of any 
evidence obtained in future cases where consent had been given with-
out a prior warning. The Supreme Court would effectively be deter-
mining the outcome in countless numbers of future cases, without 
knowing a thing about the circumstances surrounding those cases. 
259 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 227 (1973). 
260 See R. v. Mellenthin [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615, 624-25; see also R. v. Borden [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145, 
162-63, quoting with approval R. v. Wills, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 529,541 (Ont. CA. 1992). In Wills, the 
Court held that if the prosecution seeks to rely upon consent to justify what would otherwise be 
an unauthorized search or seizure, it must establish the following on a balance of probabilities: 
(i) there was consent, express or implied; (ii) the giver of the consent had the authority to give 
the consent in question; (iii) the consent was voluntary ... and was not the product of police 
oppression, coercion or other external conduct which negated the freedom to choose whether 
or not to allow the police to pursue the course of conduct requested; (iv) the giver of the consent 
was aware of the nature of the police conduct to which he or she was being asked to consent; 
(v) the giver of the consent was aware of his or her right to refuse to permit the police to engage 
in the conduct requested; and (vi) the giver of the consent was aware of the potential conse-
quences of giving the consent. See Wills, 70 C.C.C. (3d) at 541. 
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When an appellate court's decisions are capable of having such wide-
spread and unforeseen ramifications, it is understandable that the 
Court will prefer a conservative interpretation of the Constitution over 
a more expansive rights oriented construction. 
The greatest flaw with an automatic exclusionary rule is that it 
paralyzes both trial and appellate courts in the interpretation of the 
Constitution. American courts are continually plagued by the unfair 
effect that their decision might have in the case at issue and in future 
cases that remain to be litigated. Understandably, American courts are 
more inclined to find that the authorities have acted constitutionally, 
even if this requires a regressive and unprincipled interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
[T] he result of such interpretations of police conduct is a 
dilution of the individual rights guaranteed bv the Fourth 
Amendment. While the courts are "saving" reliable evidence 
from suppression in individual cases, they are also chipping 
away at some of the protections provided by the Fourth 
Amendment. The effect on the individual case is short-lived, 
but the precedential effect of such decisions linger. 261 
A discretionary rule, like that used in Canada, avoids the need to 
distort constitutional interpretation in order to achieve desired results 
in individual cases. In Canada, the courts can proceed with interpret-
ing and applying the Constitution without regard to the effect of their 
decisions on an individual defendant or the outcome determinative 
impact of a decision on future cases.262 
In this fashion, a discretionary exclusionary rule leads to a more 
expansive and honest definition of constitutional rights. The process 
of rights interpretation in Canada is not tainted by an effort to achieve 
261 Caldwell & Chase, supra note 14, at 54. See also Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth 
Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1483-84 (1985). 
262 For example, in both Duarte and Wise, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that each 
defendant's rights had been violated. See R. v. Duarte [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30; Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 
527. But this conclusion did not result in the evidence being excluded in either case. See R. v. 
Duarte [1990) 1 S.C.R. 30; Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527. In both decisions, the Court emphasized 
that the violation was not serious because the police had acted in good faith on well-established 
investigative procedures that had not previously been subjected to constitutional scrutiny. See R. 
v. Duarte [1990) 1 S.C.R. 30; Wise, [1992) 1 S.C.R. 527. In contrast, an American court could 
only avoid exclusion if the police had acted in objectively reasonable reliance on an unconstitu-
tional statute. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). Absent reliance on a statute, an American 
court could not avoid exclusion even if the police were operating in an area where the law was 
previously unsettled. 
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desired results in individual cases or by the fear that a particular 
decision will result in automatic evidentiary exclusion in an unforesee-
able future case. 
CONCLUSION 
The unceasing debate regarding the exclusionary rule in the United 
States is linked to the rule's origins. The American Bill of Rights set 
out to guarantee individual rights, but failed to address how violations 
of those rights should be remedied. In a criminal context, American 
courts determined that two options were available, either ignore such 
violations or exclude all evidence obtained by violating the Constitu-
tion. In crafting a judicial remedy to this perplexing problem, Ameri-
can courts chose an automatic exclusionary rule. 
Since its birth, the American exclusionary rule has been the subject 
of never-ending judicial and academic criticism. The Burger Court, 
critical of the exclusionary rule, seized upon a fundamental flaw in the 
evolution of the rule. The piecemeal judicial creation of the exclusion-
ary rule occurred in the absence of a clear rationale underpinning its 
development. The Burger Court focused on the deterrence rationale 
as the sole purpose of the rule. In doing this, the Court was able to 
scale back the rule's operation through the development of categorical 
exceptions in circumstances where the rule's deterrent benefits were 
deemed negligible when compared to its costs. 
These developments gave rise to the contemporary debate surround-
ing the exclusionary rule. If deterrence is the exclusionary rule's sole 
justification, should the rule be maintained if it does not deter? The 
problem with this debate is its flawed premise. Examination of devel-
opments in other democratic states, where police powers are not sub-
ject to constitutional controls, reveals that deterrence is but one of 
many potential justifications for an exclusionary rule. The need to 
maintain judicial integrity by not sanctioning unlawful police practices 
has figured highly in the creation of a discretionary exclusionary rule 
in other democratic nations, like Canada. 
The rise of the deterrence rationale has given a needed catalyst to 
American opponents of the exclusionary rule. They argue that other 
remedies, beyond evidentiary exclusion, would be just as effective in 
safeguarding individual rights while avoiding the high cost of exclu-
sion. But examination of developments in other democratic states 
reveals that other remedies are ineffective in combating or uncovering 
police excesses. It is for this reason that England, Scotland, and Aus-
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tralia fashioned discretionary exclusionary rules. Similarly, the failure 
of alternative remedies was one of the main reasons that Canada 
included a discretionary exclusionary rule in its Charter. 
The debate in the United States is closely linked to the rule's devel-
opment. The American rule was born on the premise that only two 
options existed, automatic exclusion or admission. The Canadian ex-
perience, under the Charter, reveals a third option that combatants in 
the American debate have ignored. A discretionary exclusionary rule, 
coupled with clear criteria to guide its operation, is an equally viable 
alternative. Those who cling to the current rule as the only means to 
safeguard individual rights ignore the drawbacks of automatic exclu-
sion. 
The Canadian experience. demonstrates that there are clear benefits 
to a discretionary approach in dealing with unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence. A discretionary rule more effectively copes with the compet-
ing interests at stake when the state has secured evidence by unconsti-
tutional means. The Canadian experience reveals that a discretionary 
rule: (i) avoids the unfairness and resulting loss of public confidence 
in the judicial system that is occasioned by an automatic rule; (ii) does 
not suffer from progressive narrowing of application, which has left 
important areas free from constitutional scrutiny in the United States; 
(iii) does not foster a judicial reluctance to recognize constitutional 
violations where they have occurred, ensuring that police officers are 
made aware of their errors and are able to comport their behavior to 
constitutional standards in the future; (iv) finally, and most impor-
tantly, leads to a more progressive and rights-oriented approach in the 
interpretation of the Constitution's guarantees. Under a discretionary 
exclusionary rule, constitutional interpretation is not tainted by a ju-
dicial desire to achieve justice in individual cases. 
The problem with the contemporary American debate surrounding 
the exclusionary rule is that regardless of which side eventually 
emerges victorious, no one in fact "wins." If opponents of the rule 
succeed, the Constitution's guarantees will be reduced to hollow prom-
ises. Courts will be left powerless to deal with the excesses of the state, 
even though the government has deliberately violated the charter of 
its own existence. Police excesses will be pushed into dark corners, not 
probed under the sobering light of an independent judiciary. 
Claims that there are just as effective alternatives to an exclusionary 
rule should be viewed with skepticism, in light of the Canadian expe-
rience prior to the Charter. These concerns, however, may have little 
effect on those who perceive themselves never to be the victims of 
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police excesses. Some may be content to allow society's most vulnerable 
members to fend for themselves in dealing with governmental abuses 
of power. Surrendering the interests of society's most vulnerable mem-
bers to the state, however, is fundamentally at odds with the very 
purpose of a constitutional democracy. 
Maintaining the present exclusionary rule is also not a viable option. 
In its present form, the American exclusionary rule is progressively 
being whittled away by a judiciary disenchanted with its inability to 
achieve justice in individual cases. Rather than safeguarding individual 
liberty, the present rule creates a polluted atmosphere for rights aclju-
dication. The Constitution's protections are being progressively nar-
rowed by regressive interpretations of its guarantees. Unless something 
is done to remove the incentive for such judicial conservatism, it will 
not be long before there is no such thing as "unconstitutionally ob-
tained evidence" to be excluded under an automatic rule. 
Canada has benefited from a discretionary exclusionary rule under 
the Charter. This rule was fashioned after the American experience 
under the Bill of Rights was carefully considered. It is time for the 
United States to stop teaching other nations about the benefits of 
American constitutionalism and begin learning from the experiences 
of its pupils. The Canadian experience may hold the answer to a 
question that has plagued American courts for close to a hundred 
years. There is a third option for the United States in dealing with 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence, a discretionary rule of exclusion. 
